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Abstracts
Chapter 1
In this paper I investigate whether the effect of access to finance on females differs between self-
employed and business-owning women. I adopt a linear probability model with instrumental
variables, using the receipt of windfall income and inheritances as instruments. The dataset
being used is the German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP) for the period 2001 to 2012. I find
that the probability that a woman enters into business ownership increases by 7.09 percentage
points after experiencing a one percent increase in her level of wealth. This wealth effect is 0.6
times the size for female self-employed, at 4.2 percentage points. This paper is one of the first
to describe the difference in size of wealth effects and constraints to finance for these two types
of self-employed women. These results are consistent with findings in the literature, and add
to it by showing that the impact of access to finance is underestimated when using the group
of self-employed as a proxy for entrepreneurs.
Chapter 2
In this paper we examine differences in access to finance and business value by gender. Using
recent data from the German Socio-Economic Panel, instrumented linear probability models
show that an increase in personal wealth substantially affects the probability of being a business
owner only among females. This is indicative of differential access to finance by gender. Among
business owners, fixed-effects regressions reveal that obtaining a bank loan increases mean total
business value more for females than for males. Thus, possession of a bank loan appears to be
a critical factor in explaining the business value gender gap.
Chapter 3
In this paper I develop a life-cycle model of entrepreneurship, which captures the impact of
borrowing constraints, business capital and entrepreneurial human capital. I include two types
of entrepreneurs in the set of occupational choices, where I separate out business owners from
otherwise self-employed individuals. Using the estimated model I perform three counterfactual
i
policy evaluations. I find that lowering the borrowing constraint for every individual reduces
the percentage of the population in entrepreneurship overall, whereas it increases longevity
of businesses but not necessarily other self-employment. Providing a business subsidy as well
as increasing entrepreneurship-specific human capital boosts the percentage of individuals in
entrepreneurship, but slightly lowers the persistence of business owners over otherwise self-
employed.
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Chapter 1
Female Entrepreneurship
Katharina H. Wiesemeyer
1.1 Introduction
While the percentage of women in the population of the self-employed has constantly been
increasing in Germany, rising from 27.7% in 2010 to 32.2% in 2015, the figure of new businesses
founded by women fluctuated around 37% with no obvious trend (Statistisches Bundesamt,
2017 and Wagner, 2007). This holds on a global scale too, where women are underrepresented
amongst business owners in all but seven countries in the world (Global Entrepreneurship
Monitor, 2017). The lack of growth of women-founded businesses led to economic and po-
litical debates, focusing on how to improve female participation rates in business ownership
(Welter, 2004 and Bergmann & Sternberg, 2007). A recurring discussion point regards the
access to finance for females. Intuitively, when starting a business an individual requires capi-
tal. Although some work has been done on the effect of finance on either business ownership or
self-employment for women, showing the existence of liquidity constraints (Verheul and Thurik,
2001), limited work has been conducted with the focus on how these effects differ in size when
comparing self-employed women and female business owners.
1
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In the economics of entrepreneurship, the group studied and mostly used as a proxy for en-
trepreneurs are self-employed individuals. If there exists a difference in the impact of liquidity
on self-employment compared to business ownership for females, previous research may not
entirely capture how entrepreneurship is stimulated by capital and finance.
Defining the group of entrepreneurs correctly is important. In this paper, I aim to contribute to
the existing literature by showing the difference in the effect of access to finance on the outcome
for women to become a) self-employed and b) business owners. This will be achieved by outlining
how the outcome variables are impacted by an individual’s level of wealth. Exogenous income
shocks will be used to show that an increase in wealth, which was not anticipated by the
individual, has a positive effect on the decision to become self-employed or a business owner,
and that liquidity constraints exist in accessing finance for females who are facing the decision
of business ownership or self-employment.
The motivation to distinguish between individuals becoming self-employed and becoming busi-
ness owners is driven by a recent study on that finds several types of self-employment over
the life-cycle. John Eric Humphries (2019) finds that careers involving self-employment can
be categories into a small number of economically distinct groups. Some individuals experi-
ence a short self-employment spell, with small capital investments and rapid return to paid
employment, while others experience longer spells of self-employment and have larger capital
dedicated to the business from the inception of the business.
To do so, I use data from the German Socio-Economics Panel provided by the Institute for
Economic Research in Berlin (DIW). This is Germany’s longest running longitudinal panel sur-
vey with a rich set of variables on the individual and household level. The empirical analysis
follows the method employed in a paper by Sauer and Wilson (2017). I employ a linear proba-
bility model and conduct instrumental variable regressions to infer an external income shock to
wealth. I use two instruments. Firstly, a dichotomous variable on receiving a form of windfall
income (which are inheritances, gifts, and lottery winnings), and secondly the receipt of inher-
itance only. Using these instruments, I am able to capture the effect of an exogenous finance
shock on the decision to become self-employed and the decision to become a business owner,
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using a socio-economic panel dataset to show the existence of the impact of access to finance. I
find that the effects of access to finance differ for the two groups of interest, self-employed and
business owners.
Using the receipt of an inheritance as an instrument, I find that a one percent increase in
the level of wealth leads to a 4.2 percentage point increase in the probability of becoming
self-employed. This effect is 1.7 times the size for business owners, validating that a one
percent increase in the level of wealth leads to a 7.09 percentage point increase in a woman
starting a business and becoming a business owner. Therefore, when studying the economics of
entrepreneurship and liquidity constraints for women, focusing on the group of self-employed
individuals underestimates the role of finance. Self-employed women as a proxy for female
entrepreneurs will not capture the true effect that wealth and finance have on the decision to
leave wage employment.
The rest of this paper is organised as follows. Section 1.2 will review the literature on this topic.
Section 1.3 will provide a description of the data. The empirical methodology and results will
be presented in section 1.4, followed by the conclusion in section 1.5.
1.2 Literature
The economics of entrepreneurship has been studied for nearly one century. Schumpeter wrote
one of the first papers addressing the phenomenon of entrepreneurs and their relevance for an
economy’s growth (1934). His ideas were built upon by Arrow (1962) who explained the process
of how entrepreneurship and the distribution of technical information removes inefficiencies in
an economy, underlining the importance of entrepreneurs. Increasing the number of individuals
that become entrepreneurs will therefore benefit economic growth. Hence, there is an objective
in trying to understand why an individual chooses to become an entrepreneur and how to
increase and support the supply of entrepreneurs.
One area of interest in the entrepreneurship literature focuses on the financial aspect of entering
entrepreneurship. To do so requires capital, and if access to such capital is constrained, the
4 Chapter 1. Female Entrepreneurship
individual will find it more difficult to become an entrepreneur. Evans and Leighton (1989) and
Evans and Jovanovic (1989) argued that entrepreneurs face liquidity constraints. Using data
on self-employment from the NLSY 1966 to 1981 and the CPS 1968 to 1987. They find that if
assets increase, a move into self-employment becomes more likely.
Papers by Blanchflower and Oswald (1998), Meyer (1990) or Holtz-Eakin et al. (1999) built on
this idea and designed binary choice models with the dependent variable capturing the dichoto-
mous decision of becoming an entrepreneur or not becoming an entrepreneur. Blanchflower
and Oswald outline the link between the aforementioned decision and finance by looking at
the endogenous effect of receiving an inheritance or gift using a sample of self-employed British
males (NCDS4 and NCDS5) in a probit estimation setting. The idea is that if this access to
finance increases the probability of a positive outcome of the decision variable, a constraint to
finance exists. They find that an unexpected windfall income of £4,692 is strongly correlated
with a male being self-employed in the sample. Holtz-Eakin et al. find similar results in a
probit estimation with inheritances using the US National Longitudinal Survey for Young Men
(NLSY) between 1976 and 1981.
The logit estimation in Meyer’s paper uses data on self-employment and wealth (measured
by an individual’s assets) from the 1984 US Survey of Income and Program Participation
(SIPP). Meyer estimated the likelihood of entering self-employment depending on wealth of an
individual, which too is endogenous here. Here too the author found that individuals are more
likely to enter entrepreneurship (self-employment) if there is an increase in the level of wealth.
Assets are shown to be significant, but the impact of an increase in the actual size of the wealth
measure changed the transition rate by only 0.017 percentage points.
A paper by Imbens et al. (2001) uses lottery winnings as a different form of unexpected windfall
income. The authors investigate the effect that unearned (windfall) income has on individual
earnings, the consumption level and savings. The problem that arises with analysing the effect
of this particular source of unexpected income is that playing the lottery is an endogenous
choice. To identify exogenous lottery winnings, the authors assume that amongst people win-
ning the lottery the size of the lottery winning is randomly assigned. Their results find that
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the effect of a receipt of a lottery winning between 0 and 100,000 dollar has the same effect for
males and females in terms of their savings rate and marginal propensity to consume, which is
approximately 16 percent and 11 percent respectively. Scha¨fer and Tularik (2008) look at the
effect of finance on becoming an entrepreneur from a different perspective, that is using bank
loans instead of lottery winnings, inheritances, gifts, or wealth level. Their results describe how
females in self-employment, recorded by the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP) between
1984 and 2004, are less likely to obtain bank loans and face higher interest rates when loan
applications are approved. Furthermore, if a woman receives a bank loan, the amount and the
access gained to finance is smaller than for men (Hundley, 2000).
The relationship between entrepreneurship and finance is also of interest in developing countries,
where a lack of access to credit is one of the main reasons why individuals remain poor (Hermes
and Lensink, 2007). Credit markets tend to be weak in developing countries and result in
valuable entrepreneurial project going unfunded, thereby prohibiting economic development.
To tackle this problem, Micro-finance schemes have been offered to people in need of small
sums of funds where the person lacks collateral. The economics professor and Nobel Prize
Winner Muhummad Yunus founded the “Grameen Scheme” in 1976 (Azevedo, 2006).
All these studies have to address the problem of endogeneity of wealth to the individual. If
the set of regressors (Xi) is not independent of the random disturbance (ui), then OLS does
not provide consistent estimates of the vector of parameters to be estimated. There are several
reason as to why endogeneity bias is especially problematic when studying the economics of
entrepreneurship.
Firstly, performance is often assessed in terms of variables whose values the individual chooses
themselves, such as education. However, if choices are decided by the individual’s charac-
teristics, then these variables will be likely correlated with unobserved variables, which will
make them endogenous and lead to simultaneity bias. Secondly, the decision to become an en-
trepreneur is influenced by the individual being able to observe their own wealth level over the
preceding and current period. Explanatory variables suggested to be the cause of entrepreneur-
ship can in fact be consequences of it. This includes wealth, income and savings. Prior to
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moving into business ownership, the individual might have accumulated savings to contribute
to their wealth level. Therefore, a higher level of wealth is not necessarily the cause of en-
trepreneurship, but a consequence of it. To overcome the problem of endogeneity, Instrumental
Variable (IV) estimators are used to estimate coefficients even when there are problematic vari-
ables in the set of regressors. I will use exogenous instrumental variables that influence the
endogenous variable wealth. The variables used in the aforementioned studies, that is inheri-
tances, gifts, and lottery winnings, can be used in an IV setting to instrument for wealth and
infer exogeneity of the increase in wealth.
Across the aforementioned studies, even if the effect and the types of windfall income vary, the
following observation can be drawn from them collectively: Windfall income and the level of
wealth do matter when an individual decides to become an entrepreneur, and females experience
larger constraints in accessing finance.
1.3 Data
The dataset used in this paper is the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP) from the German
Institute for Economic Research (DIW) located in Berlin. It is Germany’s longest running
survey (since 1984) and comprises a rich set of demographic variables at the individual and
at the household level, including sources of windfall income since 2001. It incorporates about
11,000 households and 30,000 individuals that are sampled annually. A particularly interesting
and useful feature for this study is a wealth survey included in the dataset. The survey provides
information on an individual’s assets, such as property owned, financial assets and tangible
assets, as well as information on whether an individual owns a business.
To better understand the data and empirical results I will define three variables: Self-employment,
business ownership and unexpected windfall income. Alongside with the data, an individual
is defined as being in self-employment, if the individual is recorded as being a self-employed
farmer, a free-lancer, help in the family home or in other self-employment. The individuals in
this group do not identify themselves as business owners in the wealth survey. The individuals
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that do identify themselves as such are defined to be business owners in this study. Unexpected
windfall income is defined by two questions. The first question is an indicator on whether
a form of windfall income was received. The second question is an indicator on whether an
inheritance, a gift, or a lottery winning was received. After identification of the three forms of
unexpected windfall income received or not, an individual can state the amount obtained.
1.3.1 Descriptive Statistics
For my research, I am interested in the female sample only. Therefore, I entirely exclude males
in my analysis and section 1.3.1 and 1.3.2 will solely focus on describing unexpected windfall
income, self-employment and business ownership for females only. However, as a means of
outlining how women differ from men and to use these differences to motivate the exclusion of
males in my research, I will compare the genders in terms of demographic characteristics and
business characteristics for the first part of section 1.3.1.
I include individuals between the age of 25 years and 65 years, due to the lack of female business
owners under the age of 25 in the sample, and the retirement age in Germany being 65 years of
age. The sample is a balanced panel, since I only include individuals that were sampled annually
for the period 2001 to 2012. Differences in individual characteristics between the genders will
be shown in the following paragraphs, and differences in the correlations of variables of interest
will be presented in the first subsection of the empirical methodology in section 1.4.
The selected sample of males consists of 13,540 person-year observations, and the sample of
females consists of 15,098 person-year observations. Table 1.1 summarizes sample characteris-
tics of males and females, and Table 1.2 focuses solely on the sample of business-owning and
self-employed females. The average age is 45 for men and nearly 46 for women. Women are
more likely to be non-employed at 31.7% or part-time employed at 26.2%, whereas for men
these figures are 18.1% and 5.1%. Men are 1.5 times more likely to be self-employed and twice
as likely to be a business owner or in full-time employment compared to women. Men are found
to be 12% less likely to be partnered than women and have fewer children than women, at 0.68
children per man compared to 0.99 children per woman. Both genders have on average 12
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years of education. Income is reported in real Euros, and the base year is 2007. In the sample,
a woman’s individual income tends to be half of a male’s income with earnings of 15,540e
compared to 32,141e1, whereas household incomes are rather homogeneous. However, assets
are again lower for females. Financial assets are on average 10,089e for women and 12,441e
for men, and tangible assets are 4,947e and 8,143e respectively. Also, a quarter of males are
found to have taken out a credit loan, compared to a fifth of females.
The amount of the credit loan does not differ much at 8,972e for men compared to 8,602e for
women. The disparity in home ownership and home value is small. 38.4% of men in the sample
tend to own a house with an average worth of 78,798e, compared to a home ownership rate
of 34.7% for women and a slightly higher home value at 80,766e on average. Table 1.2 shows
that among the sample of female business owners and self-employed, women tend to have fewer
children, are partnered less, and have higher values for all of the other variables.
In Table 1.3 I compare the value of businesses between male-headed businesses and female-
headed businesses. In my sample of 13,540 men and 15,098 women, 65.4% of business owners
are male and 34.6% of business owners are female. When comparing individuals that did not
take out a credit loan, female-headed businesses tend to be on average worth half as much
as male-headed businesses. After accounting for taking out a credit loan, the discrepancy de-
creases and female-headed businesses are around 12,000e worth less at 72,752e compared to
male-headed businesses at an average worth of 84,823e. There are two observations to draw
from this: women are underrepresented amongst business owners, and wealth seems to play a
gender-equalising role.
When looking at the number of employees, individuals were given three options to provide this
information. Either the individual has 0 employees, between 1 and 9 employees, or more than
9 employees. More than 9 employees is least likely for both gender groups, and men tend to
have fewer one-person businesses than females.
1Incomes for females are more uniformly distributed at the lower end compared to the distribution being
more concentrated around the average and higher end for males.
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Table 1.1: Variable means
Variable Males Females
Age 45.052 45.989
(11.155) (10.934)
Non-employed 0.181 0.317
(0.386) (0.466)
Full-time employed 0.649 0.336
(0.433) (0.472)
Part-time employed 0.051 0.262
(0.331) (0.44)
Self-employed 0.062 0.048
(0.291) (0.209)
Business Owner 0.057 0.037
(0.232) (0.168)
Partnered 0.569 0.684
(0.495) (0.465)
Number of Children 0.688 0.988
(0.976) (1.03)
Years of Education 12.532 12.235
(2.684) (2.516)
Individual Income 32141.051 15539.874
(27596.268) (17214.569)
Household Income 37957.934 37925.488
(22709.266) (23085.264)
Credit 0.254 0.209
(0.435) (0.406)
Amount Credit 8972.63 8602.52
(26191.31) (30058.96)
Home Owner 0.384 0.347
(0.486) (0.476)
Value Home 78798.82 80766.38
(132122.25) (139964.61)
Amount Financial Assets 12441.51 10089.54
(40774.56) (38865.96)
Amount Tangible Assets 8143.69 4947.46
(69645.38) (43787.53)
NY 13,540 15,098
Note: Standard deviations in parentheses.
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Table 1.2: Variable means of the female business owner and self-Employed sample
Variable Mean
Age 45.35
(9.746)
Partnered 0.505
(0.5)
Number of Children 0.878
(1.092)
Years of Education 13.615
(2.857)
Individual Income 25813.159
(29748.771)
Household Income 47375.544
(35434.151)
Credit 0.25
(0.433)
Amount Credit 14214.91
(582.050)
Home Owner 0.469
(0.499)
Value Home 110121.79
(179892.617)
Amount Financial Assets 11657.90
(34067.827)
Amount Tangible Assets 7040.53
(5053.942)
NY 4,628
Note: Standard deviations in parentheses.
Table 1.3: Business characteristics by males and females
Males Females
Percentage of Business Owners 65.4% 34.6%
No Credit 137,589.70e 66,014.95e
(354,931.80e) (175,946.10e)
Credit 84,823.62e 72,752.29e
(317,295.20e) (480,505.20e)
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Table 1.4: Number of employees
Variable Males Females
0 employees 37.28% 52.08%
up to 9 employees 54.68% 43.32%
more than 9 employees 8.04% 4.6%
These 4 tables provide an overview of the differences between the genders, especially in terms
of financial characteristics. Females are less liquid with regards to their income and assets,
fewer women have businesses compared to men, and females tend to have businesses of lower
value and fewer employees than men. Hence, I argue that these differences motivate the split of
the sample, to better understand how constraints to finance may impact the decision to enter
self-employment or business ownership for women only.
1.3.1.1 Unexpected Windfall Income
In Table 1.5 and Table 1.6, I present summary statistics on my instrumental variables, the
variables on unexpected windfall income. Table 1.5 shows that a form of windfall income is
received by 3.4% of females in the sample, where inheritances and gifts are each obtained by
1.6%, and lottery winnings are received by 0.2%.
Table 1.5: Receipt of windfall income - females
Variable Mean Std. Dev.
Windfall Income 0.034 0.181
Inheritance 0.016 0.123
Gift 0.016 0.125
Lottery winning 0.002 0.047
NY 15,388
Table 1.6 shows the average amount of unexpected windfall income and the breakdown of
the amount into the three windfall income categories. The average windfall income received
by a female in the sample is 32,496e, with the amount of inheritances to have an average of
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46,897e, gifts to have an average of 17,457e and lottery winnings to have an average of 45,187e.
Table 1.6: Amount of windfall income - females
Variable Mean Std. Dev.
Windfall Income 32496.76 76241.10
Inheritance 46897.54 84992.29
Gift 17457.94 34911.35
Lottery winning 45187.32 167012.31
NY 15,388
Note: Windfall income is reported in real Euros. The base year is 2007.
1.3.1.2 Female Self-Employed and Business Owners
This section expands on Table 1.2, outlining the sample characteristics of females divided
between five occupation states; non-employed, full-time employed, part-time employed, self-
employed and business owners. The main focus will be on the two states of interest, which are
self-employed and business owners.
Firstly, females in self-employment and business ownership are more likely to transition between
occupation states. Table 1.7 portrays the transitions between occupation states of females in
the sample. About a third of self-employed and business owners stay in their respective oc-
cupation state between year t and year t-5 compared to two thirds of full-time employed and
two thirds of part-time employed. Hence, transitioning out of self-employment and business
ownership is more likely than leaving full-time or part-time employment.
Table 1.7: Transition in percentages - females
Occupation state in t
Occupation state in t-5 1 2 3 4 5
Out of labour (1) 43.38 29.50 25.09 1.25 0.77
Full-time employed (2) 7.23 68.71 22.53 0.97 0.56
Part-time employed (3) 6.21 21.77 70.84 0.67 0.51
Self-employed (4) 6.11 36.94 19.17 36.39 1.39
Business Owner (5) 4.39 33.92 24.56 2.92 34.21
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Secondly, female self-employed and business owners differ in terms of family characteristics, such
as partnership status. When decomposing the partnership status of a female by her occupation
state, it can be seen that around 75% of business owners are partnered, compared to only 55%
of self-employed. Of those females that are partnered, 26.6% are in a partnership where the
partner is also a business owner.
With regards to births of children, the majority of births happen before and after the age of 30
for all females in the sample. The distribution shifts to the right for women in self-employment,
and even further to the right for female business owners. The respective average ages for giving
birth are 32.67 years for all women, 34.08 years for self-employed women and 39.07 years for
female business owners. These results differ when considering only the birth of the first child.
Here, the averages of women in self-employment giving their first birth is closer to the mean
of the whole sample, with 32.28 years for all women compared to 32.46 years for self-employed
women. For female business owners, giving birth to the first child occurs at an average age of
37.75 years, more than five years later.
1.4 Empirical Methodology and Results
In this part of my paper I will present results of ordinary least square regressions in section
1.4.1, to show the existence of correlations between becoming a) self-employed or b) a business
owner, and the level of net wealth. I take the logarithm of net wealth to achieve a uniform
distribution. The main results are outlined in section 1.4.2, in which I use a linear probability
model with instrumental variables. Instrumenting for the log of net wealth with unexpected
windfall income allows me to observe the effect of an exogenous income shock to wealth. The
effect of wealth on the outcome variable is endogenous to the individual, and with the individual
knowing their wealth level the observation of an increase in wealth over preceding periods cannot
explain a sudden move into business ownership of self-employment. In the final section, 1.4.3.,
I validate my results with the use of a variety of robustness checks.
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1.4.1 OLS Regressions
In this section I present ordinary least square regression results to show that correlations differ
between men and women, and that correlations also differ for self-employed and business owners.
The OLS regression models are of the following form:
Yit = α + βlog(NetWealthit) + γXit + uit (1.1)
Yit is the outcome variable. It is either a binary variable for self-employment or not, or a
binary variable for business owner or not. Xit includes observable characteristics shown in the
regression tables. The regressions in table 8 show the correlation between the log of net wealth
and the binary dependent variable for the entire sample, males and females. When taking the
log of net wealth, I drop the zero- and negative values as in Sauer & Wilson (2016). Therefore
I use a truncated sample and distribution, sacrificing statistical significance for ease2. In the
first column, the binary dependent variable combines both outcome variables to become a)
self-employed and b) a business owner. I use a variety of control variables. These range from
continuous variables such as age, years of education and work experience measured in years,
as well as the number of children and the log of individual income, to binary variables such
as being in a partnership, having given birth one year and five years ago, or working in the
manufacturing and service sector. I find that a one percent increase in net wealth correlates
with an increase of 2.78 percentage points in the probability of becoming either self-employed or
a business owner. Being female correlates with a decrease of 7.2 percentage points of a positive
outcome of the dependent variable.
In columns 2 and 3 I separate the outcome variable into becoming a) self-employed and b) a
business owner. Here, the coefficient on the level of wealth is smaller on the dependent variable
of becoming self-employed, with a positive correlation of 1.99 percentage points when net wealth
2The natural log transformations commonly applied to wealth for meeting the statistical assumptions may
not always be the best solution in adjusting for skewness given wealth’s unique properties. One solution to
overcome this, would be to use the inverse hyperbolic sine (IHS), θ−1 sinh−1(θnetwealth) = θ−1log(θnetwealth+
(θ2netwealth2 + 1)1/2) (Pence, 2006).
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Table 1.8: OLS regressions - male and female sample
(1) (2) (3)
All Self-Employed Business Owner
Log of Net Wealth 0.0278*** 0.0199*** 0.0263***
(0.00166) (0.00149) (0.00144)
Age 0.0104*** 0.0098*** 0.0040**
(0.00234) (0.00205) (0.00192)
Age2 -0.0001*** -0.0001*** -0.0001***
(0.00003) (0.00002) (0.00002)
Years of Education 0.0048*** 0.0044*** 0.0023***
(0.00107) (0.00097) (0.00088)
Work Experience FT 0.0005 0.0003 0.0012
(0.00105) (0.00093) (0.00084)
Work Experience FT2 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000
(0.00002) (0.00002) (0.00002)
Work Experience PT 0.0024* -0.0003 0.0016
(0.00122) (0.00109) (0.00098)
Work Experience PT2 -0.0001*** -0.0000 -0.0001***
(0.00004) (0.00004) (0.00003)
Working Partner 0.0148*** 0.0178*** 0.0112**
(0.00534) (0.00490) (0.00449)
Number of Children 0.0100*** 0.0049 0.0060**
(0.00346) (0.00313) (0.00289)
Gave birth t-1 -0.0073 0.0006 -0.0008
(0.01494) (0.01386) (0.01320)
Gave birth t-5 0.0701*** 0.0462*** 0.0647***
(0.02015) (0.01776) (0.01842)
Log of Income -0.0050* -0.0009 -0.0008
(0.00291) (0.00263) (0.00234)
Female -0.0720*** -0.0569*** -0.0590***
(0.00559) (0.00517) (0.00463)
Manufacturing Sector -0.0696*** -0.0625*** -0.0547***
(0.00656) (0.00572) (0.00576)
Service Sector 0.0189*** 0.0228*** 0.0019
(0.00599) (0.00553) (0.00489)
Constant -0.3968*** -0.3731*** -0.2695***
(0.05296) (0.04696) (0.04399)
Observations 14929 14929 14929
R2 0.054 0.043 0.056
F 47.4646 37.4956 42.5264
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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increases by one percent. However, the coefficient on the level of net wealth is a third larger
in size at 2.63 percentage points, when the dependent variable is the business owner outcome
variable. Thus, the positive correlation between the outcome variable and the log of net wealth
is larger for business owners than for self-employed. In Table 1.9, I replicate the OLS regression
results for men and women to show the differences in correlations between the genders when
entering self-employment or business ownership.
Columns 1 and 2 depict results of OLS regressions for the male sample and columns 3 and 4
outline the same for the female sample, each divided into becoming self-employed and becoming
a business owner. The correlation of an increase in net wealth by one percent is smaller for
men becoming self-employed than moving into business ownership, at 3.18 percentage points
compared to 4.36 percentage points. The same holds for females, the correlations are higher
for females entering business ownership than self-employment, with 2.61 percentage points
compared to 4.36 percentage points. Other interesting coefficients on variables include the
number of children, which shows a larger correlation for females than males when entering
self-employment with an increase of 1.8 percentage points per extra child. I control for fertility
choice, since self-employment as well as business ownership are occupation choices picked for
their potential of combining household and work responsibilities. Worth noticing is, that the
correlations are larger for males than females when deciding to enter into business ownership.
Individual income on the other hand has a negative correlation for females becoming business
owners as well as self-employed, whereas the correlations are positive for the male sample.
As outlined in the tables, an increase in net wealth will have a stronger positive correlation
for the outcome variable of starting a business than deciding to become self-employed for both
genders. This suggests that for both, men and women, access to finance plays a different role in
self-employment compared to business ownership. Furthermore, differences in the correlations
between men and women for the two outcome variables exist, underlining that the correlations
are gender-specific. Along with the observed under-representation of women, I will focus on
women in my analysis. Therefore, the regression output tables displayed in the rest of this
section will include the observations from the female sample only.
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Table 1.9: OLS regressions - split of male and female sample
Male Sample Female Sample
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Self-Employed Business Owner Self-Employed Business Owner
Log of Net Wealth 0.0318*** 0.0436*** 0.0105*** 0.0261***
(0.00251) (0.00250) (0.00174) (0.00156)
Age 0.0180*** 0.0152*** 0.0073*** 0.0032**
(0.00455) (0.00439) (0.00228) (0.00182)
Age2 -0.0002*** -0.0002*** -0.0001*** -0.0000**
(0.00005) (0.00004) (0.00002) (0.00002)
Years of Education 0.0011 0.0017 0.0061*** 0.0037***
(0.00171) (0.00159) (0.00124) (0.00099)
Work Experience FT -0.0062*** -0.0077*** 0.0026** 0.0021**
(0.00239) (0.00225) (0.00105) (0.00095)
Work Experience FT2 0.0001* 0.0001*** -0.0001*** -0.0000
(0.00004) (0.00004) (0.00002) (0.00002)
Work Experience PT 0.0015 0.0007 0.0009 0.0021**
(0.00312) (0.00294) (0.00115) (0.00097)
Work Experience PT2 -0.0002* -0.0001 0.0000 -0.0001***
(0.00014) (0.00013) (0.00004) (0.00003)
Working Partner 0.0349*** 0.0350*** 0.0044 0.0003
(0.00788) (0.00754) (0.00605) (0.00501)
Number of Children 0.0023 0.0106** 0.0178*** 0.0050
(0.00443) (0.00468) (0.00452) (0.00330)
Gave birth t-1 -0.0133 -0.0126 0.0139 0.0109
(0.02106) (0.02031) (0.01659) (0.01573)
Gave birth t-5 0.0523* 0.0759*** 0.0207 0.0271
(0.02794) (0.02879) (0.01949) (0.01978)
Log of Income 0.0085** 0.0064 -0.0082** -0.0065**
(0.00426) (0.00402) (0.00327) (0.00264)
Manufacturing Sector -0.0806*** -0.0665*** -0.0190** -0.0262***
(0.00782) (0.00800) (0.00739) (0.00653)
Service Sector 0.0138 0.0072 0.0352*** 0.0065
(0.00930) (0.00848) (0.00644) (0.00538)
Constant -0.5872*** -0.6054*** -0.2935*** -0.1470***
(0.09604) (0.09432) (0.05453) (0.04261)
Observations 7546 7590 7303 7339
R2 0.051 0.070 0.033 0.022
F 24.6784 29.1258 12.9472 10.3754
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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1.4.2 IV Regressions
To capture the effect of unexpected external income on the decision to become self-employed
and the decision to become a business owner, a linear probability model with two stage instru-
mental variables will be employed and estimated. I do so, since OLS estimates when compared
to IV estimates, have been shown to be biased up- or downwards. A paper from 1995 by
McKinley et al. pointed out that endogeneity bias and measurement error can exist in school-
ing and experience variables when using OLS compared to IV. In their paper, they find that
OLS estimates are biased by roughly 40 percent. Vieira (1999) observes that the OLS esti-
mates in his paper are also downwards biased when studying the returns to education. Using
instruments for schooling resulted in the schooling variable not being correlated with other
variables. Comparing my own OLS and IV estimates, I find that for wealth the OLS estimates
are biased downwards as well when compared to estimates retrieved from a regression using an
instrument.
The causal relationship of interest is the relationship between net wealth and the binary de-
pendent variable as shown in equation 1.2. Using first-stage estimation, the effect of windfall
income on net wealth is captured in equation 1.3. The log of net wealth is regressed on the
windfall income variable along with other covariates, the same covariates as in section 1.4.1.,
making windfall income an exogenous instrument. This first-stage regression will then predict
estimates to be replaced for net wealth as shown in equation 1.4. Net wealth along with other
covariates will give estimates showing the effects on the binary dependent variable, using the
statistics to calculate and determine probabilities in the case of a positive outcome.
Yit = α + βNetWealthit + γXit + uit (1.2)
NetWealthit = α + ρWindfallIncome+ γXit + νit (1.3)
Yit = α + δ ̂NetWealth+ γXit + it (1.4)
Yit is the binary outcome variable, Xit includes observable characteristics and uit, νit and it
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capture unobservable characteristics of individuals in the dataset. The dichotomous dependent
variable in the first and third column is the binary choice of a female deciding to become self-
employed or not. In the second and fourth column the outcome variable is a female deciding
to become a business owner or not. In column 1 and 2, net wealth is instrumented with the
general receipt of unexpected windfall income. In column 3 and 4, the instrumental variable is
the receipt of an inheritance. All regressions have an F-test and Chi2 value above 10.
1.4.2.1 Main Results
The first-stage estimates as in equation 3 are presented in Table 1.10 of this section. The
dependent variable is net wealth in logarithms. Columns 1 and 2 are the first-stage regressions
that use receiving a windfall income as an instrument, and columns 3 and 4 use the receipt of
an inheritance as an instrument. Receiving a source of unexpected windfall income increases
net wealth by 76.92 percentage points in the first-stage regression using the self-employment
outcome variable and by 76.98 percentage points in the first-stage regression using the business
owner outcome variable. The receipt of an inheritance leads to an increase in net wealth by
99.9 percentage points in the first-stage regression using the self-employment outcome variable
and by 99.73 percentage points in the first-stage regression using the business owner outcome
variable. All estimates of the instruments used are statistically significant at the 1% significance
level. With regards to other statistically significant estimates, the regression output shows that
aging by one year increases the log of net wealth by 11.25 to 11.64 percentage points, and by
12.1 percentage points in the first-stage regression for the business owner outcome variable with
inheritances as an instrument. Education has similar coefficients across the specifications, with
an extra year spent in education increasing the log of net wealth by around 3.5 percentage points.
Having a partner in full-time employment increases the log of net wealth by approximately
38 percentage points across all specifications. A one percent increase in individual income
(measured in logarithms) will lead to an increase in the dependent variable by 22.51 to 23.77
percentage points. The second-stage results are presented in Table 1.11. As a reminder, columns
1 and 2 use the overall receipt of a source of windfall income as an instrument for the log of
net wealth, and columns 3 and 4 use the specific receipt of an inheritance as an instrument for
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the log of net wealth. The binary dependent variable is a female becoming a) self-employed in
columns 1 and 3 and b) a business owner in columns 2 and 4.
The results show that an increase in the level of wealth by one percent increases the probability
of becoming self-employed by 2.24 percentage points. For becoming a business owner, the
effect of a one percent increase to wealth is 3.7 times larger than for the self-employed, at 8.38
percentage points. These results do not only give estimates for an increase in wealth as in the
OLS regressions where the increase in wealth is known to the individual, but an exogenous
increase in wealth that is unexpected to the individual. By using the instruments, we can infer
a sudden increase in wealth and gain estimates that assess the shock of an unknown wealth
increase and a move into entrepreneurship following this shock.
The same holds when using the receipt of an inheritance as the instrument. Columns 3 and
4 show that an increase in the level of net wealth by one percent improves the probability of
a positive outcome, becoming self-employed, by 4.2 percentage points. The effect on entering
business ownership is 1.7 times bigger for females, at 7.09 percentage points. Both estimates
are statistically significant at the 1% significance level. Again, the effect of wealth and access
to finance is smaller for self-employed women compared to female business owners.
Regarding further statistically significant estimates, the coefficients on having a working part-
ner are attracting attention. Having a partner in full-time employment increases the probability
of entering self-employment for women, but does not do so for women entering business own-
ership. Maybe access to finance gained by a partner’s income is not a significant source for
start-up capital. Furthermore, an increase in the number of children has a positive effect on
becoming self-employed, but a statistically insignificant and negative effect for entering business
ownership. A suggestion as to why this may be the case is that access to child care may be
more difficult to attain, and it is more difficult to enter business ownership without child care
than moving into self-employment. The flexibility gained from entering self-employment for
balancing household and work responsibilities may also explain this trend. Unfortunately, the
survey does not provide data on child care options that cover individuals in the wealth survey.
Lastly, a 1% increase in income also has a negative effect on starting a business, but less so
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Table 1.10: First stage regressions - female sample
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Log of Log of Log of Log of
Net Wealth Net Wealth Net Wealth Net Wealth
Receipt of 0.7692*** 0.7698***
Windfall Income (0.08058) (0.07734)
Receipt of 0.9990*** 0.9973***
Inheritance (0.12628) (0.12048)
Age 0.1125*** 0.1164*** 0.1158*** 0.1210***
(0.01934) (0.01917) (0.01937) (0.01920)
Age2 -0.0005*** -0.0005*** -0.0006*** -0.0006***
(0.00021) (0.00021) (0.00021) (0.00021)
Years of Education 0.0343*** 0.0320*** 0.0356*** 0.0340***
(0.00803) (0.00788) (0.00803) (0.00788)
Work Experience FT -0.0069 -0.0046 -0.0095 -0.0068
(0.00781) (0.00774) (0.00783) (0.00775)
Work Experience FT2 -0.0001 -0.0002 -0.0000 -0.0001
(0.00018) (0.00017) (0.00018) (0.00018)
Work Experience PT 0.0041 0.0030 0.0058 0.0051
(0.00836) (0.00825) (0.00837) (0.00826)
Work Experience PT2 0.0005* 0.0005* 0.0005 0.0004
(0.00028) (0.00028) (0.00028) (0.00028)
Working Partner 0.3834*** 0.3930*** 0.3746*** 0.3855***
(0.04138) (0.04064) (0.04138) (0.04066)
Number of Children 0.2886*** 0.2987*** 0.2880*** 0.2979***
(0.02496) (0.02436) (0.02491) (0.02431)
Gave birth t-1 0.2217* 0.2888** 0.3034** 0.3746***
(0.12984) (0.12640) (0.13317) (0.13052)
Gave birth t-5 -0.2275* -0.2284* -0.2027 -0.2112*
(0.12940) (0.12471) (0.12898) (0.12411)
Log of Income 0.2377*** 0.2279*** 0.2367*** 0.2251***
(0.02076) (0.02022) (0.02071) (0.02019)
Manufacturing Sector 0.2455*** 0.2232*** 0.2603*** 0.2326***
(0.07358) (0.07264) (0.07435) (0.07341)
Service Sector -0.0443 -0.0352 -0.0278 -0.0250
(0.04444) (0.04394) (0.04435) (0.04385)
Constant 3.3223*** 3.2968*** 3.2811*** 3.2409***
(0.43306) (0.42822) (0.43327) (0.42846)
Observations 6936 7242 6957 7263
R2 0.0327 0.0267 0.0866 0.0299
F 91.12 99.07 62.58 68.52
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
22 Chapter 1. Female Entrepreneurship
Table 1.11: IV regressions - female sample
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Self-Employed Business Owner Self-Employed Business Owner
Windfall Income Windfall Income Inheritance Inheritance
Log of Net Wealth 0.0224 0.0838*** 0.0420*** 0.0709***
(0.01536) (0.02013) (0.00670) (0.02609)
Age 0.0025 0.0054 0.0102*** 0.0037
(0.00271) (0.00341) (0.00232) (0.00400)
Age2 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0001*** -0.0000
(0.00002) (0.00003) (0.00002) (0.00003)
Years of Education 0.0026** 0.0012 0.0051*** 0.0018
(0.00121) (0.00132) (0.00118) (0.00144)
Work Experience FT 0.0012 0.0024** 0.0007 0.0023**
(0.00089) (0.00108) (0.00094) (0.00104)
Work Experience FT2 -0.0000** -0.0000 -0.0000** -0.0000
(0.00002) (0.00002) (0.00002) (0.00002)
Work Experience PT -0.0009 0.0016 -0.0006 0.0015
(0.00095) (0.00117) (0.00102) (0.00113)
Work Experience PT2 0.0000 -0.0001*** 0.0001 -0.0001***
(0.00003) (0.00004) (0.00004) (0.00004)
Working Partner 0.0065 -0.0268*** 0.0178*** -0.0220*
(0.00761) (0.00957) (0.00590) (0.01149)
Number of Children 0.0091 -0.0158** 0.0273*** -0.0124
(0.00564) (0.00713) (0.00473) (0.00859)
Gave birth t-1 -0.0100 -0.0149 0.0089 -0.0099
(0.01205) (0.01938) (0.01080) (0.01962)
Gave birth t-5 0.0309* 0.0411* 0.0178 0.0370*
(0.01879) (0.02313) (0.01943) (0.02246)
Log of Income -0.0138*** -0.0226*** 0.0014 -0.0199***
(0.00500) (0.00545) (0.00327) (0.00644)
Manufacturing Sector -0.0067 -0.0448*** 0.0114 -0.0414***
(0.00821) (0.01052) (0.00731) (0.01043)
Service Sector 0.0277*** 0.0081 0.0255*** 0.0072
(0.00543) (0.00615) (0.00575) (0.00599)
Constant -0.1862*** -0.3780*** -0.0214 -0.3372***
(0.06512) (0.08509) (0.05365) (0.09647)
Observations 6936 7242 6957 7263
R2 0.1827 0.1847 0.1798 0.1816
Chi2 117.1319 80.6301 118.1413 81.7543
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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for becoming self-employed. This is consistent with findings by Boden (1999), showing that a
female tends to stay in her job when she experiences an increase in her salary.
1.4.3 Robustness Checks
Tables of robustness checks are included in Appendix A, with all F-test and Chi2 values being
higher than 10. My first concern was that the unexpected exogenous income variables selected
as instruments would not capture the true effect. Inheritances can be anticipated, and may
not be as unexpected as suggested. Since the dataset also provides indicators for whether an
individual received a gift and whether an individual received a lottery winning, I employed the
linear probability model defined in section 1.4.2 using the receipt of a gift and the receipt of a
lottery winning as instruments.
The results show similar statistically significant trends in the effects of wealth on the binary out-
come variables. First-stage results are shown in Table 10 in Appendix A. The log of net wealth
increases by 66.24 percentage points in the self-employment sample and by 62.58 percentage
points in the business owner sample after the receipt of a gift by a female individual. When
receiving a lottery winning, the log of net wealth rises by 60.49 percentage points and 82.09
percentage points respectively. Table 11 shows the results of the effect on the binary dependent
variables. For self-employed the probability of a positive outcome is smaller compared to the
probability of a positive outcome for business owners. Using the receipt of gifts as an instru-
ment outlines that a one percent increase in the log of net wealth results in a 6.04 percentage
point rise in the outcome of a woman becoming self-employed. For the business owner outcome
this is 7.28 percentage points. The effect is even more pronounced when using the receipt of a
lottery winning as an instrument. The impact on the entry into self-employment is 6.18 per-
centage points compared to a larger effect on the decision to become a business owner at 8.50
percentage points. Again, the effects of wealth and on access to finance are more noticeable
for business owners than the self-employed. Therefore, my results are consistent with the ones
retrieved by using other unexpected windfall income variables. Another concern was that using
a binary variable as an instrument may incorrectly estimate the effect of an unexpected shock
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in access to finance. By dichotomising the variable, I am assuming that the fitted line is linear
throughout the outcome variable and variable of interest. More than two values may matter.
Thus, I use the dataset’s continuous variables on the amount of windfall income received by an
individual.
Tables 12, 13, 14 and 15 use continuous windfall income variable instead of binary variables as
an instrument. Table 12 shows first-stage regression results of using general windfall income
and inheritances in 1,000e as instruments. The estimates are statistically significant at the
5% significance level. An increase in the size of windfall income or specifically in the size of
an inheritance by 1,000e increases the log of net wealth by 0.8 percentage points and by 0.9
percentage points for the self-employment sample, and by 0.57 percentage points and by 0.54
percentage points for the business owner sample. These estimates are consistent with Meyer’s
findings in his 1990 paper, stating that the general receipt of assets has a larger impact on
wealth than an increase in the amount of assets.
The effects in Table 13 show that an increase in the log of net wealth by one percent using
an increase in windfall income by 1,000e as an instrument result in an increase in the positive
outcome by only 0.3 percentage points for self-employed, and by a larger 5.04 percentage point
increase in the probability of entering into business ownership. Using an increase in inheritance
by 1,000e as the instrument depicts that a female is 2.33 percentage points more likely to
become self-employed after a one percent increase in the log of net wealth, whereas choosing
business ownership becomes 3.51 percentage points more probable for a woman. The results
reflect the same trend, that is if windfall income or inheritance increases by 1,000e the effect
of access to finance and wealth is larger for business owners than for self-employed.
Table 14 and 15, as Table 12 and 13, also use a continuous variable as an instrument. There
was too little data on the amount of lottery winnings recorded, and I could only use the amount
recorded for gifts received for further robustness checks. First-stage results in Table 14 show
that after an increase in gifts by 1,000e the log of net wealth increases by 0.4 percentage points
for the self-employment sample and by 0.47 percentage points for the business owner sample.
As shown in table 15, the effect of an increase in the log of net wealth by one percent results in
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an increase in the probability of a positive outcome, becoming self-employed, by 2.75 percentage
points and by 4.33 percentage points for the business owner outcome. Again, the effect of an
increase in access to finance is larger for the outcome variable of becoming a business owner.
Additionally, I include different first stage regression results in table 18 to table 22. This is
to justify the use of my instruments and the variable I am instrumenting for. The receipt
of windfall income, inheritances, gifts and lottery winnings do have the largest effect on net
wealth. Even if a form of windfall income may be anticipated by an individual, the estimates
on net wealth exceed the estimates on home value, financial assets or tangible assets. Hence,
instrumenting for net wealth using the receipt of either of the four types of unexpected windfall
income is the best option.
1.4.3.1 Time of Business Entry and Survival
Does the effect of receiving an inheritance depend on the period it was received in, and does
the receipt of an inheritance have the same effect for females that stay in business ownership
for more than one period? In the following section I present results to firstly validate that my
estimates hold when receiving an unexpected income shock in t-1, t-2 and t-5 periods before
entering business ownership. Secondly, I present findings that show the robustness of access to
finance for business owners of at least 2 consecutive periods.
To understand how crucial a role access to finance plays over time, I create lagged variables of
the receipt of a windfall income and an inheritance. I do this to see whether an unexpected
windfall income shock is only increasing the number of businesses created if received in the
current period, or whether the effect rises if the time span between the income shock and the
business start increases. In Table 16, I find that windfall income one year prior to the start of
a business has the largest impact. It increases from 7.1 percentage points to 11.99 percentage
points. For entering self-employment, this figure declines from 4.2 percentage points to 3.05
percentage points. However, this effect further decreases as we go beyond a one period lag for
both outcome variables, becoming self-employed or not and becoming a business owner or not.
These results suggest, that the impact of an unexpected income shock is the largest for women
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who enter business ownership one year after receiving a form of windfall income.
Table 17 presents results on the effect of access to finance on a business that survives more than
one period, hence has been recorded for at least two periods. The reason behind conducting
these regressions is due to the different motivations of individuals entering self-employment or
business ownership. For instance, a motivation behind self-employment can be a new mum’s
avoidance of entering inactivity or unemployment. On the other end of the spectrum, one may
find a business owner that considers starting a business as a permanent job. It seems that the
increase in wealth of one percent increases the probability of owning a business after at least
one period of business ownership by 52 percentage points.
1.5 Conclusion
Previous work in the female entrepreneurship literature studied the effect of liquidity constraints
and access to finance by using self-employed individuals as a proxy for entrepreneurs. Newest
studies have recently begun to use data on business owners to account for entrepreneurs, but
without a justification as to why using the group of self-employed may be critical and business
owners may be preferred. This paper is one of the first to show the differing effects of access to
finance through wealth by comparing the results for self-employed women and female business
owners using a rich and balanced panel dataset. Women are more likely to enter business
ownership after experiencing an unexpected income shock, than moving into self-employment.
Using the receipt of an inheritance to instrument for the log of net wealth in a linear probability
model shows that the probability of a female becoming self-employed increases by 4.2 percentage
points after a one percent increase in net wealth. This probability increases to 7.09 percentage
points for a female becoming a business owner. I find similar results using different forms
of windfall income as robustness checks, that is gifts and lottery winnings and binary and
continuous variables. Therefore, increasing access to finance and thus wealth can result in an
increase in the creation of female-headed businesses. How high an amount is needed to achieve
a gender-equalising effect of loans is the scope of work I am currently conducting.
1.5. Conclusion 27
I further conclude, that research using self-employed individuals as a proxy for female en-
trepreneurs vastly underestimates the effect of access to finance by more than one third. Fo-
cusing on future policies to improve the business creation rate across an economy and across the
female population should opt for using business owners as a proxy for entrepreneurs to capture
the true effect that wealth and finance have on the decision to leave wage employment. These
could include government programs that provide start-up loans to females, or a restructuring
of bank loans offered to females starting a business.
Additionally, my results show that the number of children and working partners do not have
a positive effect on becoming a business owner, contradictory to what has been shown in the
literature analysing the self-employed. Business ownership is a great channel for women to
combine domestic and work responsibilities, but it seems that having children is more likely to
decrease the supply of female business owners. If entering business ownership were made easier
by increasing access to finance, this may also make the option more attractive for women that
consider having children, as well as increasing employment options for females and supporting
employment creation.
The future use of this paper is to define entrepreneurs as business owners rather than self-
employed individuals when studying the relationship between entrepreneurship and access to
finance in a structural setting. To expand my results, I am planning on designing a discrete
choice dynamic programming model, that will analyse how a change in the size of access to
finance will incentivise an individual to start a business, and the amount needed for a gender-
equalising loan towards entrepreneurs. Performing counterfactual policy evaluations will then
help understand which policies and channels of access to finance can improve the level of
business creations specifically for females.
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2.1 Introduction
In the economics of entrepreneurship, stark gender differences have been uncovered, but the
study of their determinants is still in its infancy. According to the Global Entrepreneurship
Monitor (2017), women are under-represented among business owners in all but seven countries
throughout the world. The under-representation of women has persisted, even as the rate of
entrepreneurship has increased substantially over time. For example, in Germany, the country
of focus in this study, the rate of business ownership increased from 3 to 7 percent over the past
decade. At the same time, the percentage of females in the pool of business owners declined
from roughly 45 per cent to under 35 percent (Statistisches Bundesamt, 2017). A substantial
gender gap among entrepreneurs also exists in terms of business value. Across OECD countries,
female entrepreneurs tend to own businesses of considerably lower value than male entrepreneurs
(OECD, 2016).
To try and understand why gender differences in entrepreneurial outcomes might arise, re-
searchers have mostly focused on first identifying the determinants of female entrepreneurship.
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One hypothesis is that marriage plays an important role. Surprisingly, it has been found that
female entrepreneurs are more likely to be married than females in salaried employment. In
Britain, roughly nine out of 10 female business owners with employees are married and have a
spouse engaged in full-time employment (Cowling and Taylor, 2001). Bruce (1999) finds that
having a spouse in full-time employment can increase the probability that a woman moves into
entrepreneurship by as much as 50 percent. This is probably due to non-labour income acting
as an important source of business finance.
The effect of children on female entrepreneurship is also not straightforward. In the US, an
increase in the number of children has been shown to increase the number of self-employed
women. This may be a consequence of the high costs of child care and lack of flexible work
arrangements (Lombard, 2001). However, this correlation does not hold for the sub-group of
self-employed women who are business owners. Female business owners also spend fewer hours
on child care than even their salaried counterparts (Hildebrand and Williams, 2003).
Besides marital status and number of children, levels of human capital are likely to influence
the decision to be a business owner. Coleman (2007) finds that the more education or the
more work experience a female accumulates, the more likely she is to start a business. More
curiously, it has been found that female entrepreneurs tend to have accumulated fewer years of
work experience prior to starting a business than male entrepreneurs (Lee and Rendall, 2001).
Moreover, Devine (1994) shows that selfemployed females earned 72 percent of what salaried
females earned. Self-employed males, on the other hand, earned 107 percent of the earnings of
salaried males. This suggests that there could be differential selection into entrepreneurship by
gender, which may account for a portion of the business value gender gap.
Gender discrimination is another possible source of gender differentials in entrepreneurship.
For example, wage discrimination in salaried employment can feed back into differences in
human capital causing less female entrepreneurship and worse business performance (Bald-
win and Johnson, 1992). However, Boden (1999) argues that wage discrimination in salaried
employment leads to an increase rather than a decrease in female entrepreneurship.
Gender discrimination may also be present in the market for loanable funds. Kim (2006)
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illustrates how start-up loan applications by female-owned businesses have the lowest success
rate, whereas male-owned businesses have the highest, and mixed-gender headed businesses
are intermediate between the two categories. Financing constraints could underlie the finding
that female-headed businesses generate fewer sales (Loscocco and Robinson, 1991) and have
fewer assets and lower profits than male-headed businesses. Even after controlling for sector,
companies owned by men can reach twice as many sales and hold twice as many assets as
companies owned by women (Coleman, 2007).
Public policy and private institutions have responded in a variety of ways to try and correct
gender differentials in entrepreneurship. In Germany, there is a national agency (Bundesweite
Gruenderinnenagentur, or BGA) that aids start-up activities with the aim of increasing the rate
of female entrepreneurship. The BGA offers business counselling, entrepreneurship training,
and mentoring schemes and facilitates access to finance.
There is also a non-governmental association (Goldrausch Frauennetzwerk, or GF) which of-
fers small interest-free loans for female-headed business activity in Berlin. Between 2010 and
2013, only 70 women received loans from the GF, with a default rate as low as 1.3 percent
(OECD, 2017). In collaboration with the government and federal ministries, Germany’s third
largest bank (Kreditanstalt fur Wiederaufbau) has developed a programme of subsidies for fe-
male entrepreneurs. However, these kinds of agencies and programmes that focus on female
entrepreneurship are relatively rare and not widely established throughout the country.
In this paper, we contribute to the literature on gender differences in entrepreneurship, and
emphasize the importance of developing better policy solutions, by examining unusually detailed
data from the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP). The SOEP is particularly useful for
studying the underlying determinants of gender differences in business ownership and business
value because it is longitudinal and contains a comprehensive wealth survey. In particular,
the SOEP contains information on windfall income, financial and tangible assets, and business
ownership status, as well as a measure of total business value among entrepreneurs that own a
business.
The usefulness of the information on windfall income in the SOEP can be understood as follows.
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Individuals who wish to become business owners often acquire capital prior to starting their
business. This can be from personal savings and other sources of non-labour income, such
as spousal earnings. Hence, a positive relationship between individual net wealth and being
a business owner is not necessarily a causal relationship, with those who have more personal
assets being more likely to be business owners. There is also likely to be an element of reverse
causation.
The lack of causation also means that a positive relationship between assets and business
ownership does not indicate the existence of liquidity constraints, i.e. an inability to borrow
which compels the use of one’s own financial capital. But having a reliable measure of windfall
income would allow one to measure the causal effect of personal wealth on the likelihood of being
a business owner and infer the existence of liquidity constraints. This is because the windfall
income would represent an unanticipated income ‘shock’ that was not acquired specifically for
the use in the business.
We exploit the information on windfall income in the SOEP as a source of exogenous variation
in net wealth within an instrumental variables (IV) regression framework. IV regressions run
separately by gender indicate that the probability a woman reports being a business owner
increases by 7.08 percentage points with a 1 percent increase in net wealth. Among males,
the corresponding magnitude is 1.32 percentage points, and is not precisely estimated. The
results suggest that access to finance may be a substantial impediment to business ownership in
Germany only for females. This more restricted access to finance among female entrepreneurs
may be an important explanation for the under-representation of women in business ownership.
The information provided by the SOEP also reveals sharp gender differences in the total business
value of existing businesses. On average, male entrepreneurs own businesses that are worth 40
percent more than those of female entrepreneurs. In fixed effects regressions that use business
value as a dependent variable, it is shown that owning a bank loan increases mean business
value by e96,500 for men. The increase in mean business value among females is e174,545.
Hence, obtaining a bank loan has a strong gender-equalizing effect on total business value. The
results imply that whether or not one owns a bank loan is a key determinant of the business
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value gender gap. The data also clearly indicate that women business owners in Germany are
less likely to have secured a bank loan than men.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2.2 surveys the previous literature most
relevant for our study. Section 2.3 examines the relationship between personal wealth and
business ownership. Section 2.4 studies the determinants of total business value. Section 2.5
summarizes and concludes.
2.2 Background
Entrepreneurs drive economic growth because they discover and exploit informational asym-
metries, effectively removing static and dynamic inefficiencies in a market economy, thereby
increasing social welfare (see, for example, Hayek (1945), Arrow (1962), and Kirzner (1973)).
Entrepreneurs also introduce technological innovations in the economy which increase living
standards for society via wealth generation and job creation (Birch, 1979). The widespread
benefits of entrepreneurial activity have motivated economists to study the underlying fac-
tors leading individuals to become entrepreneurs, and how rates of entrepreneurship can be
maintained or increased through public policy.
A main focus in this regard has been the role of liquidity constraints. Several studies suggest
that liquidity constraints are an important obstacle to entrepreneurship. Blanchflower and
Oswald (1998) studied the issue by using data on the receipt of an inheritance (windfall income)
in a sample of British males. Since the receipt of an inheritance is found to increase the
probability a male becomes self-employed, they infer the existence of liquidity constraints in
Britain. Holtz-Eakin et al. (1994) find similar results using American data from the National
Longitudinal Survey for Young Men. Liquidity constraints have also been found to differ by
gender. Exploiting data on windfall income in an instrumental variables framework, Sauer
and Wilson (2016) show that the positive effect of personal wealth on the propensity to be a
business owner is stronger for women than for men in the UK. In this paper, we provide similar
evidence for Germany.
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Using data on bank loans in Germany, Scha¨fer and Talavera (2009) describe how females
in self-employment are less likely to obtain funding than men and face higher interest rates
when loan applications are approved. Hundley (2000) obtains comparable results with UK
data. Using Dutch data, Verheul and Thurik (2001) find that men and women have the same
proportion of equity and debt capital as start-up capital, but the amounts are lower among
females. Thus, women may suffer from differentially stronger liquidity constraints than men,
adversely affecting business creation, growth, and the chances of survival (see Alsos et al., 2006).
Differential liquidity constraints by gender could possibly arise from discrimination. It has been
claimed that discrimination may be the result of banks favouring certain male characteristics
over female characteristics in loan decisions (Buttner and Rosen, 1988).
In this paper, we also study the differential performance of male and female entrepreneurs after
businesses have been created. Performance can be measured in various ways, such as earnings,
assets, and profits. Other measures include business growth, survival rates, and employment
creation. For instance, in Germany, 63 percent of male entrepreneurs stay in the occupation
5 years after entering, compared to 42 percent for female entrepreneurs (Lohmann and Luber,
2004).
We focus instead on a relatively neglected measure of performance as total business value. For
new businesses, the major source of finance stems from personal bank loans. On average, more
than 50 percent of the early financial capital of a business comes from personal debt (Robb and
Robinson, 2012). If women are more liquidity constrained than men, a female-headed business
may be smaller, more at risk of bankruptcy, and have lower total business value (Hanspal,
2016)1.
2.3 Access to Finance
In this section, we examine the relationship between personal wealth and business ownership
with the aim of deducing whether females are more liquidity constrained than males. The
1See also Evans and Leighton (1989) and Evans and Jovanovic (1989) for seminal works on the link between
liquidity constraints and entrepreneurship.
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data are drawn from the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP) administered by the German
Institute for Economic Research (DIW) in Berlin between the years 2001 and 2012.
The survey is Germany’s longest running longitudinal study, starting in 1984. It includes a rich
set of demographic characteristics at the individual level (about 30,000) and at the household
level (about 11,000). One particularly relevant feature of the SOEP for our purposes is the
wealth module. It includes data on assets and property owned by individuals as well as data
on business owners and total business value.
The sample used for this analysis includes 7,692 men and 7,311 women. Descriptive statistics
reveal the following. Men included in our sample are on average 44.9 years of age whereas
women are on average 47.8 years old. Both genders have on average 12 years of education,
0.66 children per person, and about 60 percent own a savings account with monthly payments.
Fewer men have a partner in full-time employment than women, 22.8 percent compared to 31.2
percent. Men have more full-time work experience with 19.6 years compared to 13.3 years for
women. Women have more part-time work experience, with 4.5 years of experience compared
to 0.7 years for men. More males are home-owners compared to females (38.4 percent versus
34.7 percent). On average, men also have nearly twice as much individual income (e32,141),
financial assets (e12,441), and tangible assets (e8,143) than females (e15,539, e10,089, and
e4,947, respectively)2.
In the following analysis, two variables are of key importance: business ownership and windfall
(unexpected) income. Business owners are individuals who simply answered the question ‘Are
you a business owner?’ with ‘Yes’ in the survey. Here we would like to point out that the SOEP
also identifies self-employed individuals, of which business owners are a sub-group.
In this paper, we define entrepreneurs as business owners, in accordance with the definition by
the Oxford English Dictionary (2018) that an entrepreneur is ‘a person who sets up a business
or businesses, taking on financial risk in the hope of profit’. Thus, business owners are properly
distinguished from the ‘merely’ self-employed.
2Monetary figures are reported in real euros. The base year is 2007.
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Figure 2.1: Average amount of windfall income
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Note: Monetary values reported in real euros. The base year is 2007.
The second key variable, unexpected windfall income, is taken from the wealth survey and
relates to receipt of an inheritance, a gift, or a lottery winning. The data allow us to create a
binary variable for receipt of windfall income from a particular source, as well as exact windfall
income amounts.
Of all business owners, 6.82 percent have received a form of windfall income. For female and
male business owners, this number is 9.81 percent and 5.54 percent, respectively. Most sources
of windfall income received are gifts (50 percent for women and 56.1 percent for men), followed
by inheritances (32.4 percent for women and 39 per cent for men). As can be seen from Figure
2.1, the highest average value of any windfall income among both genders is that of inheritances.
This is followed by gifts and lottery winnings.
As in Sauer and Wilson (2016), we use windfall income as an instrumental variable in a regres-
sion of business ownership on personal wealth. Windfall income is interpreted as an exogenous
shock to personal wealth. IV regressions are run separately by gender and exploit the various
sources of windfall income as instruments, i.e. inheritances, gifts, and lottery winnings. The
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latter two sources of windfall income are used as robustness checks only. The causal relation-
ship of interest is between the binary dependent variable of being a business owner (Yit) and
net personal wealth (NetWealthit). The first-stage in the IV procedure correlates net personal
wealth with windfall income (WindfallIncomeit). This is shown in equations (2.1) and (2.2),
Yit = α + βNetWealthit + γXit + uit (2.1)
NetWealthit = α + δWindfallIncomeit + γXit + it (2.2)
where Xit represents other observable characteristics, and uit and it capture unobservable
characteristics of individuals.
In equation 2.2, we are conceiving of windfall income as an unanticipated source of wealth
which can be used to help finance one’s business. It does not derive from savings related to
anticipated or actual business creation, maintenance, or growth. Windfall income is assumed to
be randomly assigned conditional on other covariates in Xit. OLS estimation of equation (2.2),
the first-stage in the IV procedure, reveals that receipt of any source of windfall income increases
average male personal wealth by 48.4 percent. Average female personal wealth increases by 77.1
percent. Clearly, the relationship between receiving any form of windfall income (inheritances,
gifts, or lottery winnings) is stronger for women in our sample than for males. The effects are
highly statistically significant, at the 1 percent significance level.
IV estimation results for equation (2.1) are shown in Table 2.1. Column 1 reveals that a 1
percent increase in wealth (instrumented by the receipt of any form of windfall income) leads
to a 2.92 percentage point rise in the probability a male becomes a business owner. The effect is
not precisely estimated. Column (2) illustrates that the effect of a 1 percent increase in wealth
among females results in an 8.37 percentage point increase in the probability of becoming a
business owner. This result is statistically significant at the 1 percent significance level.
The same identification strategy with different instrumental variables results in similar findings.
Regarding the first-stage regression, if we use the receipt of an inheritance as an instrument
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Table 2.1: Linear probability model with instrumental variable regression results
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Business Owner Business Owner Business Owner Business Owner
Male Sample Female Sample Male Sample Female Sample
Instrument: Windfall Income Windfall Income Inheritance Inheritance
Log of net wealth 0.0292 0.0837*** 0.0132 0.0708***
(0.03457) (0.02010) (0.05776) (0.02608)
Constant –0.5914*** –0.3904*** –0.5303** –0.3487***
(0.16158) (0.08690) (0.23607) (0.09993)
Observations 7,504 7,242 7,504 7,242
R2 0.065 0.051 0.048 0.039
F 193.1859 80.3775 191.1778 81.3216
Controls yes yes yes yes
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Controls include individual characteristics, i.e. age, age-squared,
receipt of a loan, loan amount, years of education, presence of a working partner in full-time employment,
number of children, a measure of risk-taking, possession of a savings account, full-time work experience, part-
time work experience, employment in the manufacturing sector or service sector, and monetary characteristics,
i.e. individual income, amount of financial assets, amount of tangible assets, and whether an individual is a
home owner. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
for personal wealth, the effect is 1.32 percent for males and 7.08 per cent for females. Again,
the effect among males is not statistically significant, whereas it is for females. When using
the receipt of a gift as an instrument for wealth, the effect is 5.42 percent among males, and
7.26 percentage points for females. All first-stage regressions have an F-statistic well above
10. Using receipt of a lottery winning as an instrument, the IV estimate of the increase in the
probability of being a business owner is 1.06 percentage points for men, and 18.4 percentage
points for women. The result is not statistically significant among males but is for females.
Robustness checks show that the general conclusions are unchanged regardless of which in-
strument is used to represent windfall income. All sources of windfall income produce larger
effects for females than for males. The male effects are not precisely estimated whereas the
female effects are highly significant. Women in Germany appear to be more dependent on
personal wealth for starting a business than are males. This is highly suggestive of females
being differentially more liquidity constrained.
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2.4 Total Business Value
In this section the analysis focuses on individuals who have become business owners. We
investigate how male- and female-headed businesses might perform differently, expressed in
terms of total business value. The main goal is to understand both the role that bank loans
and gender play in determining the value of a business.
We continue with the German SOEP, using the same surveys, modules, and sample years. As
mentioned earlier, business owners identify themselves by answering a question as to whether
they are a business owner or not. After keeping business owners only and balancing the dataset,
we obtain a sample with 1,511 person-year observations, of which 69.8 percent are male and
30.2 percent are female.
In this more restricted sample, 25 percent of male business owners and 20 percent of female
business owners took out a bank loan. This is 5 percentage points larger for both genders
than in the more comprehensive sample in section 2.3. Compared to the previous sample, both
genders have on average 1 more year of education and are twice as likely to have a partner in
full-time employment (44.3 percent of men and 56.4 percent of women). Both genders have a
home ownership rate of 50 percent compared to the previous sample’s rates of 38.4 percent for
men and 34.7 percent for women. Men in the business ownership sample have a similar average
income (e33,691), whereas female business owners have a higher average income than in the
larger sample (e21,728). Another noticeable difference in demographic characteristics is in the
number of children per person. For male business owners this number rises from 0.66 to 0.76,
whereas for females the number declines from 0.66 to 0.56. Hence, female entrepreneurs have
fewer children than female non-entrepreneurs. It is the reverse for men.
Figure 2.2 displays the average total value of businesses owned by men and women by whether
a personal bank loan was held, averaged over the survey years. Without a bank loan means
that the individual did not take out a bank loan in any of the 3 years. In both cases, male
businesses have higher average value. However, holding a bank loan equalizes to a large extent
the average business value between the genders.
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As a first step in better understanding the underlying determinants of the business value gender
gap, we perform Blinder–Oaxaca decompositions (see Blinder (1973), Oaxaca (1973), and Neu-
mark (1988)). The gap in business value between male- and female-owned businesses is 40.88
percent in total. The decomposition provides us with the following insights: 16.46 percentage
points of the total difference result from differences in full-time work experience between men
and women; 8.97 percentage points of the gap result from differences in the sector in which
the business operates. Differences in taking out a bank loan between men and women account
for 3.73 percentage points of the total gap. The unexplained component of the decomposi-
tion is 10.14 percentage points. This latter component is solely due to gender and is clearly
non-negligible.
Due to the substantial equalizing effect of having a bank loan on the gender gap in total business
value, as shown in Figure 2.2, it also instructive to perform a decomposition on differences
in loan status by gender, because gender and the propensity to obtain a loan may strongly
interact. This decomposition produces the following findings. Out of the 5 percent gender
gap in the propensity to have a bank loan, only 1.53 percentage points can be explained by
differences in observed characteristics between male and female business owners. The rest,
3.37 percentage points, is due to being female. This implies that there is also a substantial
unexplained component of the 5 percent gender gap in bank loans, which is based solely on
gender.
Focusing more precisely on the OLS regressions that underlie the first decomposition above,
with the log of total business value as the dependent variable, we find the following in Table 2.2.
There is a negative correlation between business value and an indicator for taking out a bank
loan. The coefficient on the bank loan indicator is negative because loans are concentrated in
the left tail of the business value distribution (smaller businesses). However, the coefficient on
the amount of the loan is positive because business value increases with loan amount throughout
the business value distribution.
Importantly, the amount of a bank loan has a stronger positive effect on mean business value
among female business owners compared to male business owners.
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Figure 2.2: Average total business value
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This confirms the univariate correlations shown earlier where a loan bridges the gap in business
value between the genders. The coefficients related to bank loans are precisely estimated. We
also report the results of fixed-effects regressions which correct for biases due to time-invariant
omitted variables. Fixed-effects regressions also help analyse the impact of having a bank loan
on the growth in total business value rather than just the level. We estimate the following
equation:
∆Yi,2012−2002 = βBankLoani,2002 + γ∆Xi,2012−2002 + ∆ui,2012−2002 (2.3)
where the dependent variable is the change (∆) in total business value between 2002 and 2012.
The bank loan variable indicates having received a loan in 2002. Xi,2012−2002 includes the change
(∆) in observable characteristics between the years 2002 and 2012. These variables are listed
in the footnote to Table 2.2.
Table 2.2: OLS regression results
(1) (2)
∆ Business Value ∆ Business Value
Male Sample Female Sample
∆ Loan 96,500.77*** 174,545***
(41,243.66) (78,664.45)
Observations 998 412
R2 0.213 0.101
F 11.83 7.76
Controls yes yes
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. The controls are: age, age-squared, years of education, having a
partner in full-time employment, number of children, owning a savings account, work experience full-time, work
experience part-time, working in the manufacturing sector, working in the service sector, individual income,
the amount of financial assets, the amount of tangible assets, and a binary for home ownership. * p < 0.10, **
p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
The results show that the effect of a bank loan is again larger for females than males. That
is, women who took out a business loan in the year of starting a business experienced larger
growth over the next 10 years than male-headed businesses.
More specifically, among male business owners a bank loan increases mean total business value
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over the decade by e96,500. Among females, the change in total business value is e174,545.
A female-owned business with a bank loan experiences an increase in mean business value
that is nearly twice as large as comparable male-owned businesses. These findings illustrate
the substantial value of obtaining bank loans and how it is differentially important for female
business owners and closing the business value gender gap.
2.5 Conclusion
In this paper, we exploit longitudinal data from the German SOEP to study the determinants
of gender differences in business ownership and business value. Information on windfall income
is used as a source of exogenous variation in net wealth to determine the importance of liq-
uidity constraints, or access to finance, in the ability to start or maintain an existing business.
Instrumental variable regressions reveal that the probability that a female starts a business
increases by 7.1 percentage points after experiencing a 1 percent increase in net wealth. The
corresponding effect among males is only 1.32 percentage points and is not statistically signif-
icant. Thus, access to finance appears to be a substantial impediment for business ownership
only for females.
In regressions that use total business value as a dependent variable, we found that bank loans
are a key determinant in explaining differential business value by gender. The receipt of a bank
loan has a strong effect on the performance and growth of a business measured by total business
value. We find that the effect is larger in magnitude for women, for whom owning a bank loan
leads to an increase in mean total business value of e174,545. For male-headed businesses, the
estimate is half the size at e96,500. Thus, having a bank loan is an important determinant of
the business value gender gap.
The results in this paper suggest that there are likely to be substantial frictions in the business
loan market in Germany, especially with regard to the gender of the potential recipient. This
is perhaps not surprising because the number of institutions in Germany that recognize and
effectively address the special difficulties that female business owners face is relatively low.
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This is likely to be the case in many other countries as well. Therefore, policy-makers should
pay more careful attention to the proper functioning of the business loan market and explore
new ways to further encourage the application and receipt of business loans among female
entrepreneurs.
Chapter 3
A Structural Framework of
Entrepreneurship
Katharina H. Wiesemeyer
3.1 Introduction
Entrepreneurship has been increasingly covered by the media. Across the globe, policy imple-
mentations are put in place to nurture small businesses. Causes of this spike in enthusiasm
for entrepreneurs extend from their ability to create jobs, innovate markets, and achieve higher
productivity through specially designed products. Entrants incentivise competition as well as
intensify economic development and growth. Yet the study of entrepreneurship could not be
more multifaceted. As Baumol implied in his paper from 1968, “the entrepreneur is at the
same time one of the most intriguing and one of the most elusive characters [...] in economic
analysis”.
One of the areas being investigated within economics centres around the question of why indi-
viduals choose entrepreneurship as an occupation. Over the years, the number of entrepreneurs
has been rising in most countries. Figure 3.1 looks at data from the Global Entrepreneurship
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Monitor (GEM). The level of entrepreneurship in Germany has been growing, and more than
doubled over the period from 2007 to 2018. Therefore the question poses itself as to why it is
that more individuals have chosen to enter entrepreneurship, along with what the defining fac-
tors are that determine and help the creation of small businesses. The National Expert Survey
(NES) questions experts on a variety of components related to entrepreneurship. When the ex-
perts were asked to rank the availability of financing for entrepreneurs on a scale of 1 to 9 (with
9 being the maximum score), Germany received a score of 2.84. With regards to entrepreneurial
education and training, Germany was given a score of 1.84. While the entrepreneurship rate
has been rising, Germany still receives low ratings in terms of entrepreneurial support.
Figure 3.1: Entrepreneurship rate in Germany
2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 2018
Source: Global Entrepreneurship Monitor
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In this paper, I study the area of economics that focuses on the entry into, and duration of
entrepreneurship by calibrating a life-cycle model of entrepreneurship using a sample of white
males from the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP). I build on a static model created by
Evans and Jovanovic in 1989, and turn it into a model of labour supply and life-cycle decisions,
with a choice set including the individual’s occupation and accumulated wealth. My contribu-
tion to the literature lies in creating a discrete choice dynamic programming (DCDP) model
that captures the impact of borrowing constraints, business capital and entrepreneurial human
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capital. I evaluate the effect of improving each of these factors separately. More importantly,
I include two types of entrepreneurs in the set of occupational choices for the individual’s oc-
cupation decision, which has not been done in the framework of a labour supply model. I use
my calibrated model to run three counterfactual policy evaluations, to resolve the question of
how we can nurture small businesses and encourage individuals to enter entrepreneurship. For
my counterfactual evaluations, I keep two key measurements in mind: How does the percent-
age of individuals in entrepreneurship change and how does the duration of entrepreneurship
change. I measure these as responses to (i) relaxing borrowing constraints for all individuals,
(ii) injecting business capital, and (iii) increasing entrepreneurship-specific human capital.
In my proposed model, individuals are defined in their heterogeneity by an exogenously deter-
mined discrete distribution of education type. In each period (a Gregorian calendar year), an
individual makes a decision on their occupation choice after observing shocks to their employ-
ment preference and income potential. After having made this decision, the individual obtains
income from the chosen option. Following from that, the individual makes a decision on how
much to consume and how much to have as accrued wealth. The individual gains utility from
consumption, utility from being in wage-employment, and utility from being “your own boss”.
The goal is to maximise the expected present discounted value of utility from the first period
to the last period, over a finite horizon. To correctly grasp the expansion of income from wage-
employment and being-your-own-boss, I not only incorporate heterogeneous education but also
full-time and part-time work experience. I include unobservable residuals instead of explicitly
modelling frictions to the labour market (e.g. job search). I further include borrowing con-
straints as a type of financial market friction, since the model framework is that of a partial
equilibrium one and I do not incorporate changes in market prices.
Given the affluence of the structural framework, the solution for the optimal path of the individ-
ual’s choice set is not a closed-form solution and the framework is first solved numerically. After
simulating the data, I use the method of simulated method of moments (SMM) to calibrate the
model’s parameters. The resulting parameters fit well, and the simulated data fits the patterns
observed in the empirical data. The model results outline how non-pecuniary benefits from
“being your own boss” drive the entry into entrepreneurship. I follow up on this by evaluating
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my counterfactual proposals and using my model’s calibrated parameters to define changes in
the three key measurements of impact mentioned above (the percentage of individuals choosing
entrepreneurship, age at first entry, and the transition rates of entrepreneurship).
The first counterfactual evaluation of reducing borrowing constraints for all individuals leads
to a lower percentage of individuals choosing entrepreneurship but a higher period-to-period
transition rate for individuals in entrepreneurship, for both business owners and otherwise
self-employed. These findings might be the cause of two effects often observed when relaxing
borrowing constraints. One is the direct effect of consumption smoothing, and the other is the
indirect effect of individuals choosing non-employment.
The second and third counterfactual evaluations led to contrasting results. The injection of
business capital, by providing individuals with a subsidy of 20,000 Euros when continuing en-
trepreneurship, leads to a larger percentage of individuals in entrepreneurship. In the final
counterfactual evaluation, I increase entrepreneurship-specific human capital. German pro-
grams such as ‘Exist’ or ‘Go!’ aim to educate people on the occupational choice of entering
entrepreneurship and provide appropriate training, which offers individuals an indirect incen-
tive compared to the two previous counterfactual evaluations. The outcome of the two key
measurements are similar to the second counterfactual evaluation. A higher percentage of in-
dividuals are in entrepreneurship in the second and third counterfactual experiment. However,
this only holds for business owners in the second counterfactual evaluation, since the percent-
age of otherwise self-employed decreases. To conclude, the relaxation of borrowing constraints
results in longer duration of entrepreneurship, whereas a subsidy and entrepreneurship-specific
training increase the percentage of entrepreneurs observed.
The rest of this chapter is structured as follows. The coming section reviews the literature
related to the topic, which is succeeded by a description of the empirical data in section 3.3.
Section 3.4 presents the structural model, followed by section 3.5 explaining how the model is
solved. Section 3.6 lays out the calibration method, with section 3.7 discussing the calibration
results and section 3.8 listing the findings from the counterfactual evaluations. Section 3.9
concludes.
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3.2 Literature Review
The existing literature on entrepreneurship is vast and multifaceted. The following section will
focus on studies most relevant to this paper. In the first half, I will discuss theories on occupa-
tional choice models of entrepreneurship, followed by theories on wealth and entrepreneurship.
In the second half, I will examine empirical methods used in entrepreneurship research.
Among the first researchers to outline the economic significance of ‘entrepreneurial ability’ was
Robert E. Lucas. In his paper from 1978, he endows individuals with a single-dimensional
quantity, x. Whether the ability in entrepreneurship might derive from human capital, idiosyn-
cratic leadership skills or other sources, x keeps the illustration of entrepreneurial ability simple.
Abilities are constrained, fixed, and known by every individual with certainty. This addition
of heterogeneity had a profound effect on the economics literature, helping to distinguish en-
trepreneurs from employees as well as showing how abler entrepreneurs create more successful
businesses. Nevertheless, Lucas’ model predicted that entrepreneurship was bound to decline
as economies develop, which proved to be incorrect when the total number of entrepreneurs
continued to increase in the last decades of the twentieth century while capital and real wages
were both rising. In the following years, this criticism of the Lucas model prompted researchers
to question if other determinants are at work, and whether these may be missing in Lucas’
mechanism.
One of these factors is wealth. The relationship between entrepreneurship and wealth is one of
the most researched areas in the study of entrepreneurship. Economic theory has been asking
whether an individual requires personal wealth in order to become an entrepreneur. If this
is the case, then those individuals with lower levels of personal wealth may not be able to
recognise entrepreneurship as an occupation choice within possibility. Across the literature on
the connection between wealth and entrepreneurship, researchers disagree on the meaning of
the relationship. In fact, academics quarrel over its mere existence. Evans and Jovanovic (1989)
pioneered the discussion on wealth and entrepreneurship. The pair introduced the idea of a
positive correlation between entrepreneurship and wealth as being evidential credit constraints,
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which might prevent able individuals from entering entrepreneurship. The Evans and Jovanovic
model is a static model with limited liability constraints. A set of individuals can borrow a
multiple (γ) of their initial assets B to start a business, where γ is the same for each individual
and capital k ∈ (0, γB). Banks are inclined to provide a loan to individuals as a proportion of
their assets, known as Type I credit rationing. Entrepreneurial ability x enters the production
function, where income y = xkα with α ∈ (0, 1). Two predictions can be derived from the
Evans and Jovanovic model. First, there is a positive correlation between assets before entering
entrepreneurship and the likelihood of entering entrepreneurship. Secondly, those entrepreneurs
with higher levels of wealth will create larger businesses and receive higher income than those
with lower levels of wealth. The model fails in its prediction that individuals with the highest
entrepreneurial ability x are the most constrained individuals as shown by Astebro & Bernhardt
(2003, 2005) and Parker & van Praag (2006)1. In my model, I include entrepreneurial ability
as human capital in the wealth function. The intuition being that banks use human capital
as a variable in determining loan size, removing the problem of individuals with higher ability
being more constrained.
A paper by Aghion and Bolton (1997) extends the Evans and Jovanovic structure, and proposes
to rectify the aforementioned issue by creating a model in which less wealthy individuals are
cut off by a credit threshold. This credit threshold is imposed by competitive banks, since
poorer individuals will have to share a larger proportion of their marginal returns from effort
with the bank, meaning that they will have a lower incentive to supply effort. The outcome
transpiring that poor individuals are more constrained and will be refused access to finance,
therefore being denied entry into entrepreneurship. However, this approach does not capture
observed and unobserved characteristics such as the level of human capital. Thus, it disregards
the effect of human capital on borrowing potential which enters the wealth function of the
structural model outlined in this chapter.
Empirical methods in entrepreneurship research have battled their own issues. With data
1The three studies identify a positive relationship between human capital and access to finance. E.g., Parker
& van Praag (2006) use an instrumental variable estimator to evaluate the return of human capital on capital
constraints. They find that an extra year of schooling lowers capital constraints by 1.18 percentage points,
ceteris paribus.
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being prone to self-serving bias or ‘cheap talk’, economists had to arm themselves with economic
methods that disregard ‘revealed preferences’ and infer preferences from factual behaviour. One
such battle in studying the relationship of entrepreneurship and wealth is endogeneity. It is
notably an issue, since on the one hand researchers work with observable variables chosen by the
entrepreneur, which tend to be correlated with unobservable variables ceding them endogenous.
On the other hand, explanatory variables causing an individual to become an entrepreneur
might also be a result of it, leading to spurious estimates. For instance, wealth could increase
the probability of an individual becoming an entrepreneur, but being an entrepreneur could
also increase the individual’s level of wealth.
A cure against endogeneity is Instrumental Variable (IV) estimation. Studies such as the one by
Hurst and Lusardi in 2004 were among the first to use a robust estimator by instrumenting their
wealth variable. Using the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID), their instrument of choice
was the appreciation of house prices. Their findings suggest that there is not relationship
between becoming an entrepreneur and personal wealth for the majority of people. Their
estimates are positive at and after the 95th percentile of the wealth distribution, claiming
that only very wealthy individuals are liquidity constrained. They furthermore documented
this non-monotonic relationship by considering a polynomial of wealth in a probit equation
and argue that there is little evidence of a positive relationship between entrepreneurship and
wealth. A variety of papers have confronted these results. One such paper is a study by Fairlie
and Krashinsky (2006), in which the authors used data from the PSID and enriched it by
adding data from the Current Population Survey (CPS). They found that Hurst and Lusardi
aggregated heterogeneous groups in their paper, leading to their surprising findings. Fairlie
and Krashinsky separated out individuals who had lost their job from individuals that had not
lost their job. It emerges that the positive relationship between wealth and entrepreneurship
at the top of the personal wealth distribution was caused by wealthy individuals from an older
generation that had lost their job. These individuals experienced difficulties when reattempting
to enter wage-employment, and thus chose the path of entrepreneurship. When separating out
the two groups of individuals, becoming an entrepreneur is observed to be an increasing positive
rate across the personal wealth distribution. Sauer and Wiesemeyer (2018) published a paper,
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employing the method of IV estimation using a sample of females from the SOEP. The aim
was to distinguish between different categories of entrepreneurs. As the quote by Baumol at
the beginning of this chapter pointed out, entrepreneurs are one of the most elusive characters.
By separating out different archetypes, we were able to predict in more detail the impact of an
exogenous shock to wealth. We instrumented wealth by using the receipt of an inheritance, gift
and lottery winnings. Our results underline that the relationship between entrepreneurship and
wealth is strongest for those individuals that are registered business owners, whereas the effect
was only half the size for individuals that freelance. In this paper, I build on these findings by
incorporating two types of entrepreneurship alternatives in the set of occupation choice.
3.3 Data
The data for the calibration of the life-cycle model is gathered from the German Socio-Economic
Panel (SOEP), Germany’s longest running longitudinal panel study. A wealth module was
incorporated into the main survey in 2002. The sample includes individuals surveyed in the
years 2002-2016. To reduce heterogeneity among agents, I keep male respondents only. This
results in a representative sample of 29,348 male person-year observations, including male
business owners at 9.57 percent and self-employed males at 3.04 percent of the sample size.
3.3.1 Descriptive Statistics
All statistics reported include males only. This section reports summary statistics of variables
used for sample X. Sample X includes N observations of individual i ’s data Xi. Elements of
Xi will be discussed in the following subsections and consists of:
Xi = {educi, expi, t, agei,t, di,t, ai,t, yi,t, vi,t}
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3.3.1.1 Initial Conditions (Education and Type)
Education educi is divided into 3 categories within the SOEP survey. Individuals can discretely
report whether they are educated to high school level, below high school level, or above high
school level2. Values are reported in percentages in Table 3.1 for the full sample, and sepa-
rately for the 9.57 percent of business owners and the 3.04 percent of other self-employed. The
three categories of education level reported are recorded as binary variables. The majority of
males have completed their high school education. Business-owning males are characterized by
having a lower proportion of individuals educated below high school level and a higher propor-
tion educated above high school level. Self-employed males are closer to the full sample than
business-owning males in their distribution of education levels.
Table 3.1: Educational levels (%)
Variable Full Sample Business Owners Self-Employed
< High School 8.57 3.37 6.86
High School 63.10 56.74 62.52
> High School 28.34 39.90 30.61
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00
Notes: Values are reported in percentages. Individuals between the age of 25 and 65 are included in the summary
statistic.
3.3.1.2 Occupation Choice (Labor Supply Decisions and Transitions)
The occupation choice profile di,t is derived from four independent survey questions in the
SOEP. Firstly, surveyed individuals provide information on whether they are full-time em-
ployed, part-time employed or non-employed. Secondly, individuals are surveyed on whether
they earn any income from secondary employment. Thirdly, I retrieve knowledge on whether
2The data is from Germany, and receiving a high school diploma is the attainment of the German Abitur.
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an individual is wage-employed or not. Lastly, details are given on whether an individual is
a business owner or otherwise self-employed (freelancer, help in the household, agriculture,
other). Along with these four items of information, I can construct the occupation choices in
the full sample. The majority of males are full-time employed, followed by non-employment
and part-time employment, where non-employment is inactivity. Business owners make up
9.57 percent of the sample, followed by 0.17 percent of individuals that are wage-employed and
business owners contemporaneously. More detailed information on occupation choices by age
can be found in Table 23 in Appendix B3.
Table 3.2: Labor supply decisions (%)
Variable Labor Supply State
Full-Time Employed 61.60
Part-Time Employed 11.11
Business Owner 9.57
Other Self-Employed 3.04
Non-Employed 14.52
Wage-Employed & 0.17
Business-Owning
NY 29,348
Notes: Values are reported in percentages. Individuals between the age of 25 and 65 are included in the summary
statistic.
A graph on the marginal distributions of occupation choices over age is shown in Figure 3.2.
Values found on the y-axis are the count of individuals in each respective state as outlined in
Table 3.3 except for the final category4. Full-time wage-employment participation increases
throughout the lifetime, and then starts declining halfway, with part-time wage-employment
3Table 4 shows that business ownership as an occupation choice is too small in the male sample before the
age of 25. Therefore, the individuals included in the summary statistics are 25 to 65 years of age.
4Given that the number of individuals that are both simultaneously in wage-employment and own a business
are represented by 0.17 % of the sample, this state will not be included as an occupation choice in the life-cycle
model, reducing the state space and simplifying the computation of the model.
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peaking in the early 20s and then declining to stay at approximately the same level. Non-
employment increases drastically when individuals leave school, declining in the early 20s and
then increasing again in the 60s. Business ownership exhibits a trend comparable to full-time
wage-employment at a smaller scale. Other self-employment does not show high variation over
the lifetime of individuals.
Figure 3.2: Labour Supply Distributions over Age
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Note: FT = full-time wage-employed, PT = part-time wage-employed, BO = business owner, SE = other
self-employed and NE = non-employed.
Table 3.4 includes transition rates between the occupation states. I exclude the occupation
state where individuals are in wage-employment and business ownership at the same time.
The dexter diagonal (upper left to lower right in bold) provides information on the percentage
of males that did not change their occupation state. Four fifths of full-time wage-employed
men stay within full-time wage-employment (81.5 percent), followed by 75.0 percent and 68.9
percent of men staying in business ownership and non-employment respectively. Nearly every
second self-employed men continues self-employment (45.4 percent). This number drops to less
than one third for wage-employed individuals (22.8 percent). With regards to transitions be-
tween states, the highest transition rate occurs at 43.0 percent where part-time wage-employed
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Table 3.3: Occupation choice transition rates
State t+1
State t FT PT SE BO NE Total
FT 0.815 0.069 0.013 0.029 0.074 1.00
PT 0.430 0.298 0.031 0.032 0.209 1.00
SE 0.138 0.104 0.454 0.258 0.046 1.00
BO 0.114 0.028 0.077 0.750 0.031 1.00
NE 0.141 0.138 0.013 0.019 0.689 1.00
Note: FT = full-time wage-employed, PT = part-time wage-employed, SE = other self-employed, BO = business
owner and NE = non-employed.
males move to full-time wage-employment. This is followed by the move from self-employment
into business ownership (25.8 percent), and the switch from part-time wage-employment to
non-employment (20.9 percent). Of equal size are the move from non-employment into full-
time wage-employment (14.1 percent), self-employment into full-time wage-employment (13.8
percent) and business ownership into full-time wage-employment (11.4 percent).
3.3.1.3 Monetary components (Wealth and Income)
Monetary variables in this paper are income yi,t, and wealth ai,t. Values are reported in real
Euros and the base year is 2007. To understand the distribution of mean income across the
sample, I plot the average log of income for occupations that receive an income in Figure 3.3.
The occupation with the tightest distribution of incomes is full-time wage-employment. Part-
time wage-employment exhibits a bi-modal distribution. Business ownership does not only
have the highest median, but also the highest upper adjacent value. The widest inter-quartile
range of incomes is found for self-employment, showing that self-employment has the broadest
spread of incomes in the mid 50 percent of observed incomes. Figure 3.4 shows mean income
distributions in the sample over age and by state. It is worth noting, that there are heavy fluc-
tuations in the income values of business owners and other self-employed, the cause of which
is the proportional small number of business owners and self-employed in the sample (9.57
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percent of the individuals in the sample are business owners and 3.04 percent are otherwise
self-employed). Throughout their lifetime, business owners earn on average more than full-time
wage-employed individuals. Part-time wage-employed males earn roughly half of the amount
full-time wage-employed men earn. Otherwise self-employed males earn less than full-time
wage-employed individuals. Mean incomes rise with age (except for non-employment). Other-
wise self-employed males earn less than full-time wage-employed individuals. Mean incomes rise
with age (except for non-employment). Table 24 in Appendix B provides details on mean labor
incomes by state at each age. Figure 3.5 shows the mean and median net wealth distributions
over age. Mean net wealth growths faster than median net wealth, and remains about twice as
large across age. Table 25 in Appendix B provides details on mean and median net wealth for
each age category.
Figure 3.3: Individual mean income across occupation states
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Note: FT = full-time wage-employed, PT = part-time wage-employed, BO = business owner, and SE = other
self-employed.
3.3.1.4 Reduced-form Regressions
The following two tables include regression output providing estimates to better understand the
relationship between the individual’s characteristics and occupation choices, and the relation-
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Figure 3.4: Individual mean and median wealth distribution over age
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Note: FT = full-time wage-employed, PT = part-time wage-employed, BO = business owner, SE = other
self-employed and NE = non-employed.
Figure 3.5: Individual Labor income distributions over age by state
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ship between the individual’s characteristics and monetary outcome variables. Observations
used are restricted to individuals that are between 25 and 65 years of age in the SOEP data.
The first table outlines the results of a multinomial logit regression as average marginal effects.
The four columns show the four outcome categories and compares each to the base outcome
(non-employment). Education does not have an effect on the 4 occupation choices. The only
significant effect is the negative impact of being educated above high school level on working
in part-time wage-employment compared to non-employment. Age significantly increases the
probability of working in full-time wage employment by 1.48 percent, whereas it decreases the
probability of working in part-time employment by 1.8 percent compared to non-employment.
Table 3.4: Average Marginal Effects - Multinomial Logit
(1) (2) (3) (4)
FT PT SE BO
I(High school) 0.0039 -0.0123 0.0033 0.0026
(0.01463) (0.00788) (0.00706) (0.01252)
I(> High school) 0.0167 -0.0180** 0.0136* -0.0136
(0.01571) (0.00883) (0.00732) (0.01316)
Age 0.0148*** -0.0075*** 0.0022 -0.0014
(0.00309) (0.00173) (0.00136) (0.00258)
Age2 -0.0002*** 0.0001*** -0.0000 0.0000
(0.00003) (0.00002) (0.00001) (0.00003)
Full-time work experience 0.0062*** -0.0024*** -0.0012*** -0.0021***
(0.00059) (0.00037) (0.00020) (0.00044)
Full-time work experience2 0.0000 0.0000** -0.0000 -0.0000
(0.00003) (0.00002) (0.00001) (0.00003)
Part-time work experience -0.0196*** 0.0109*** 0.0033*** 0.0066***
(0.00195) (0.00091) (0.00053) (0.00149)
Part-time work experience2 0.0013*** -0.0007*** -0.0006*** -0.0001
(0.00020) (0.00010) (0.00013) (0.00015)
Log of income 0.1490*** -0.0957*** -0.0140*** -0.0274***
(0.00518) (0.00276) (0.00200) (0.00405)
Log of net wealth -0.0895*** -0.0040*** 0.0033*** 0.0908***
(0.00258) (0.00135) (0.00104) (0.00237)
Observations 29,159 29,159 29,159 29,159
Pseudo R2 0.2217 0.2217 0.2217 0.2217
LR χ2 5791.53 5791.53 5791.53 5791.53
Note: FT = full-time wage-employed, PT = part-time wage-employed, SE = other self-employed, and BO =
business owner. Robust standard errors in parentheses. The base outcome is non-employment. * p < 0.10, **
p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
3.3. Data 59
Furthermore, full-time work experience decreases the likelihood of being part-time wage-employed,
or becoming a business owner or otherwise self-employed, whereas part-time work experience
increases the probability of entering all of these. Another year of part-time work increases the
probability of entering business ownership by 6.6. percent compared to non-employment. This
effect is halved for otherwise self-employed at 3.3 percent. The logarithms of income and net
wealth have differing effects on the outcomes. A one percent in crease in income improves the
probability to stay in full-time employment. For the other outcomes this decreases. The impact
of a one percent increase in wealth has a high positive effect on entering business ownership
at 9.08 percent, whereas this percentage is only 0.33 percent for otherwise self-employed and
negative for wage-employment. Net wealth has the highest increase in the probability of en-
tering business ownership compared to non-employment. Table 3.6 outlines two reduced-form
regressions. In the first column the outcome variable is the logarithm of individual income,
whereas the second column uses the logarithm of net wealth as the dependent variable.
Table 3.5: Reduced-form regressions
(1) (2)
Log of Income Log of Wealth
High school 0.2021*** 0.3659***
(0.01637) (0.05615)
I(> High school) 0.6271*** 0.9977***
(0.01805) (0.06043)
Age 0.0426*** 0.2082***
(0.00544) (0.01694)
Age2 -0.0003*** -0.0017***
(0.00006) (0.00019)
Full-time work experience 0.0101*** 0.0212***
(0.00213) (0.00650)
Full-time work experience2 -0.0004*** -0.0005***
(0.00005) (0.00016)
Part-time work experience -0.0460*** -0.0822***
(0.00524) (0.01605)
Part-time work experience2 0.0019*** 0.0027**
(0.00040) (0.00118)
Constant 8.9146*** 4.2473***
(0.10477) (0.33233)
Observations 29,159 29,159
R2 0.239 0.213
F 491.4909 351.0491
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Having a high school diploma increases income by 20.21 percent and net wealth by 36.59
percent. The impact of education increases as the individual is educated beyond high school,
which leads to an increase in wages by 62.71 percent and doubles net wealth. Age has a positive
impact as well. Being one year older increases income by 4.26 percent, and net wealth improves
by 20.82 percent. The increase continues at a decreasing rate. Full-time work experience has
a positive effect on income and net wealth, whereas part-time work experience decreases the
return to wages and net wealth. Full-time work experience increases at a decreasing rate,
whereas part-time work experience decreases at an increasing rate.
3.4 Model Structure
The discrete choice time period is denoted by t, where one period is a Gregorian calendar year.
The sequential decision-making of the agent starts at age age = 25 in period t = 1, and finishes
in the terminal period t = T at age age = 65.5 The occupation state variable is denoted by
dkt , k ∈ K. The variable dkt = 1 if occupation state alternative k is chosen, and 0 otherwise.
An agent decides among these k alternatives in each of T finite discrete periods of time. Each
choice has an outcome on wages and utility, and the agent’s information on the current and
future rewards at time t is contained in the state space Ω(t).
The state space contains the education level of the agent, which joins the wage functions
as an exogenous variable. This variable defines the agent’s permanent heterogeneity. It is
questionable to condition the agent’s optimal path on the education level, since it is exogenous
and therefore not non-stochastic (Keane and Wolpin, 1997). This lack of persistent unobserved
heterogeneity could be rectified by starting the optimization problem at the age of the agent
when education was zero for every agent in the model. However, defining a model in such a
way would be computationally burdensome, since decisions made by parents with regards to
schooling and fertility would be adding further dimensions to the state space. Another possible
5The starting age is derived from the data. No significant business ownership activity is observed before the
age of 25 as shown in Appendix B. The terminal age is the retirement age in Germany as of the time this paper
was written.
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solution would be to have as many types as agents (types = number of agents), which would
also be computationally unfeasible6.
At the beginning of every decision period t the agent observes shocks to occupation preferences
ui,t ∈ Rk where ui,t ∼ N (0, Σu), income yi,t ∈ Rk where yi,t ∼ N (0, Σy), and business value shock
vi,t ∈ Rk where vi,t ∼ N (0, Σv). I assume that the preference shock ui,t, the income shock yi,t
and the business value shock vi,t are serially uncorrelated and distributed independently. If the
agent chooses one of the four employment alternatives, he will observe income from working. If
he chooses non-employment, the individual is given a non-working compensation benefit. The
income is calculated using a Mincer wage equation as shown in section 3.4.1. Additionally,
the agent must decide on an amount to save and not consume which is denoted as ∆at+1, the
change in the agents net wealth, which is at−1 − at. Changes in net wealth are discretized for
computational reasons related to the payoff matrix. ∆at+1 is defined as ∆at+1 ∈ {∆a ... a}.
This amount will become part of the agent’s assets and thus net wealth in the next period t+1.
The difference between future additional net wealth and current period’s earnings is the agent’s
consumption.
The objective of this exercise is for the individual to find the optimal expected present dis-
counted value of their life-time utility from the starting period to the final decision period, a
finite horizon problem. There are several moving state variables. These represent the work
experiences gained for full-time work experience and part-time work experience throughout the
model periods, as well as periods spent in non-employment and net wealth at. Two more bi-
nary moving variables are added, incorporating whether the individual ever experienced being
self-employed or a business owner.
The discrete choice dynamic programming task goes as follows. An individual makes decisions
in each period t that are assumed to maximize the discounted value of lifetime utility. The
discount factor is β ∈ (0, 1). Therefore:
6In future work, it would be attractive to assume that initial education levels are exogenous conditional on
the age of entry in the model and its endowment vector.
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max
dkt ,∆a
k
t+1
E
[
T∑
t=1
βtut
]
(3.1)
where ut is subject to a budget constraint and subject to a consumption and a borrowing
constraint. The utility function is an isoelastic function as follows:
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(3.2)
where the first additive part is the utility derived from consumption, followed by the utility
derived from being wage-employed (k = 1, k = 2) and the utility derived from being your own
boss (k = 3, k = 4). The last additive part is a preference shock (k = 5). The budget constraint
is expressed as:
ct + at+1 = yt + (1− δ)vt + (1 + r)(at − vt) (3.3)
where ct is consumption in period t, at+1 is wealth not consumed in period t, yt is income in
period t, vt is the business value in period t if k = 4. δ ∈ (0,1) is the depreciation rate of the
business, r > 0 is the interest rate, and at is the individual’s net wealth in period t. There is
an opportunity cost of vt in not having put the amount towards the individual’s net wealth.
7
Consumption ct is constrained by a lower bound, which is the period-independent consumption
floor cmin, and an upper bound, which is the individual’s sum of income, net wealth, and the
business’s value minus the minimum net wealth an individual is able to have in the next period
as shown in equation 3.4.
cmin ≤ ct ≤ yt + (1− δ)vt + (1 + r)(at − vt)− at+1 (3.4)
7I assume no further adjustment costs. If the individual decides to leave business ownership, vt becomes at.
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The borrowing constraint has a lower bound, which is the minimum savings an individual can
have which would be comparable to a minimum bound given by banks to save.8 The individual
cannot have more savings than income plus net wealth plus business assets minus the what is
needed for consumption. This borrowing constraint will prohibit consumption that is perfectly
smoothed.
at+1 ≤ at+1 ≤ yt + (1− δ)vt + (1 + r)(at − vt)− cmin (3.5)
3.4.1 Wage Functions
The model requires further parameterisation as outlined in the following subsections. One such
addition to the model characterises wage offer functions. These wage functions are modelled as
Mincer-style wage equations capturing individual skills as identified by the wage offer functions
for wage-employed wage in equation 3.6 and ‘own boss’ wage in equation 3.7 below,
wwet = exp
[
β0we + β1weI(highschool) + β2weI(> highschool) + β3we(age)
+ β4we
(age)2
100
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wobt = exp
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where I(highschool) and I(> highschool) are education dummies for an individual having
gained the equivalent of a high school qualification, and for the individual having gained a
8Assuming unmodeled imperfect financial markets, where the unmodeled lender sets a lower bound.
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qualification above high school. The individual’s age is found in age, and full-time work ex-
perience as well as part-time work experience are observed in xftt and x
pt
t . Two indicators for
whether an individual was in full-time wage-employment or part-time wage-employment in the
previous period are added to 3.6, xftt−1 and x
pt
t−1 respectively. Equation 3.7 includes an indicator
on whether the individual has experience of being their ‘own boss’ from the previous period,
xobt−1. Additionally, 3.7 further incorporates the individual’s business value vt, since business
value correlates positively with the individual’s wage. Lastly, both functions include transi-
tory productivity shocks, wet and 
ob
t . Where for both wage-employment options, i.e. full-time
wage employment and part-time wage employment, wet is drawn individually from the same
distribution. Meaning I will draw two shocks for each wage employment option from the same
distribution. I will also draw two shocks for each “own boss” option from the same distribution,
i.e. obt is also drawn individually from the same distribution.
yt =

wwet ∗ ft if k = 1
wwet ∗ pt if k = 2
wobt ∗ ft if k = 3
wobt ∗ ft if k = 4
b if k = 5
(3.8)
It follows that each individual receives per period income y as demonstrated in equation 3.8,
which can be expressed as the following income yt, where ft and pt correspond to the annual
hours worked in full-time or part-time mode. When the individual enters the model, full-time
and part-time work experience along with experience of “being your own boss” are set to 0.
Initial net wealth a1 can be positive, negative or zero. The laws of motion for accumulating
experience are as follows:
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xftt+1 = x
ft
t + d
1
t (3.9)
xptt+1 = x
pt
t + d
2
t (3.10)
xobt+1 = d
3
t (3.11)
xobt+1 = d
4
t (3.12)
where the individual can only have previous period experience or no previous experience in
entrepreneurship.
3.4.2 Business value and the lower bound for net wealth
In each period t, the individual is subject to a borrowing constraint from unmodeled financial
market imperfections. Unmodeled banks set a lower bound so that net wealth does not go
below at, where at can be negative. Therefore, the individual is not able to smooth consumption
perfectly. The lower bound borrowing constraint progresses as a function of the individual’s
eduaction, age, and work experience for t = 2, . . . , T as shown in 3.13. First period netwealth
a1 has to further satisfy the condition where a1 > a1. Initial net wealth is taken from the first
period observations from the data. Equation 3.14 determines the value of the business v, if
the individual is a business owner (k = 4) in period t. Business value evolves as a function of
education, age and work experience, as well as a business value shock. This is done to forecast
future business value potential from human capital.
at = exp
[
γ0 + γ1I(highschool) + γ2I(> highschool) + γ3(age)
+ γ4
(age)2
100
+ γ5x
ft
t + γ6
(xftt )
2
100
+ γ7x
pt
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(xptt )
2
100
+ γ9I(x
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t−1)
] (3.13)
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vt = exp
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3.5 Solution Method
In this section, I portray how to computationally solve my life-cycle model. The structural
model is a discrete choice problem. It is a dynamic problem with a finite horizon, which can be
solved backwards from the final decision period T. The choice set contains 100 elements (5 ×
20) made up of the following 2 choice variables: an occupation state variable with 5 mutually
exclusive alternatives, and a savings choice with 20 mutually exclusive alternatives. Variables
used to define an individual’s heterogeneity, i.e. the level of education, are also discretized as
described in the data section. The agent, after observing shocks to their occupation preferences
and income, decides on the choice variables and obtains utility. Agents are forward looking and
try to maximize expected lifetime rewards instead of choosing the largest immediate reward,
where β captures the agent’s preferences of immediate over future rewards.
The dynamic program is solved by the agent choosing the optimal sequence of alternatives. The
model being formulated recursively and the horizon being finite, allows for solving the model
by backward recursion starting in the final period T. The terminal value of discounted lifetime
utility is calculated as a function by the state variables of the final period. We denote the j-th
element of the choice set as follows:
djt ∈ {FT, PT, SE, BO, NE} × {∆at=1, ...∆aT} (3.15)
and the utility from a given choice set as ujt . The state space Ω(t) incorporates states points
ω(t) ∈ Ω(t) which include moving state variables, heterogeneity defining variables, and shocks.
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ω(t) = {(expFTt , expPTt , expSEt , expBOt , dkt−1, at), (educ, age), (ut , wet , set , bot )} (3.16)
The first part of equation 3.16, (expFTt , exp
PT
t , exp
SE
t , exp
BO
t , d
k
t−1, at), is a generic element that
results from past decisions up to t-1. The second element (educ, age) is fixed permanently.
Shocks and aget form the exogenous part that moves across decision periods, t. The Bellman
equation takes the following form, where Vt is written recursively with Et being the expectation
operator at the start of t:
Vt(ωt) = max
djt
ujt + βEt [Vt+1(ωt+1)|ωt]
= max
djt
ujt
[
Vt(ωt)
1, Vt(ωt)
2, Vt(ωt)
3, ..., Vt(ωt)
J
] (3.17)
where t denotes the period, ωt denotes the state space in period t, and j denotes the choice
combination. The discounted lifetime utility at each choice combination j is expressed as:
V jt (ωt) = u
j
t + βEt
[
Vt+1(ωt+1)|djt = 1, ωt
]
(3.18)
where the expectation is taken over the joint distribution of the next period’s stochastic shocks.
Choices and choice combinations are assumed to be made optimally in any given period for
the alternative-specific value functions. From hereon we will call the second additive part of
equation (3.18) Emaxt. Each Emaxt is a function mapping the predetermined state space ωt
and the choice combination j to a value. Shocks are observed and used to make a decision
in period t, but since t and t+1 are uncorrelated and independent, the information gained
from observing the shocks does not affect Emaxt. The individual in the model compares the
alternative-specific value functions to follow on a discounted lifetime utility maximizing path.
To solve the dynamic programming problem by backward recursion, we have to consider the
value functions V jt (ωt) or rather the EmaxT functions in the final period T , where the individual
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has the following J equations system for ωT ∈ ΩT :

V 1T (ωT ) = u
1
T + βVT+1(d
1
T = 1, ωT )
. . .
V JT (ωT ) = u
J
T + βVT+1(d
J
T = 1, ωT )
(3.19)
We know the functions of each choice combination j in the final period T. Knowing EmaxT , we
can take expectations of VT (ωT ) = max[V
1
T (ωT ), . . . , V
J
T (ωT )] to calculate EmaxT−1 and so on,
until all Emaxt for all t have been calculated recursively. In the last period, no expectations
are taken over the next period’s shocks.
After all Emaxt have been computed, we can solve for the optimal decision path and choice
combinations j at each period t. I do this by calculating the probabilities that an individual
chooses choice combination j, which is an integral over the space of the errors, so that choice
combination j is the preferred choice combination. The calculated probabilities are conditional
on the deterministic part of state space Ωt. Since this method becomes computationally bur-
densome as the dimension of the state space increases, I use an approximation method by
interpolation as applied in papers by Keane and Wolpin (1994, 1997, 2001). This way I retrieve
approximated expected values of maxima alternative-specific value functions at each state point
Emaxt. To implement this solution method, I made assumptions on functional form of the pa-
rameters and model distributions. The data used for calibration is outlined in the previous
section.
3.6 Calibration Method
To calibrate the parameters for my life-cycle model of entrepreneurship, I use the observations
of the data described in section 3.4. Using the approximated Emaxt values calculated by the
solution method in section 3.5, I simulate a dataset of 2000 agents from the first model period
(where the agent enters the model at age 25) to the final model period (where “retirement”
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occurs at age 65). The moments used for comparing the actual and simulated data are the
occupation state rates, the one-period transition rates, and the occupation choice distribution
by age as well as the distribution of mean income by occupation state and age. Educational
level and initial wealth are exogenous. I simulate the dataset by defining a trial vector of
parameters θ ∈ Θ. A period-by-period shock is randomly generated for every decision period
t, in every mth simulation (where m = 1, . . . M). I calculate outcomes of choice realisations,
and the succeeding income realisations along with next period’s wealth realisations. The mth
simulated data for individual i is denoted by:
Xmi = ({dj
m
i,t , y
jm
i,t , a
m
i,t+1, v
m
i,t, age
m
i,t}Tt=1, ami,1, educi) (3.20)
where I make the assumption that educi and agei are observed without error for each individual
i, thus agemi,t is given by t and age.The solution of the dynamic programming model provides
the conditional probabilities that an individual chooses choice occupation d. Given that part
of the endogenous state variables in Ωt are not observed, I would have to calculate conditional
probabilities of unobserved state variables by integrating out all choices over the unobserved
elements’ distribution. To overcome this, McFadden (1989) proposes to use a method known
as Simulated Method of Moments (SMM) to estimate models that are solved using numerical
integration. The SMM moment estimator is:
argmin g(θ)′Wg(θ) (3.21)
where θ is a vector of all unknown parameters that minimises the distance between the moments
calculated from the actual data and the moments calculated from the simulated data. In the
SMM criterion function, W is the optimal weighting matrix for the SMM estimates, which is
the inverse of the estimated variances from the actual data divided by the number of individuals
that add to each moment9.
9In my calibration, I set the weighting matrix equal to the identity matrix to set the moment conditions
equally.
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The estimate of the model moments g(θ) is defined as:
g(θ) =
1
N
N∑
i=1
gi(θ) = [m1 − µ1(θ)...mn − µn(θ)] (3.22)
where (m1, . . . ,mn) are the data moments and (µ1, . . . , µn) are the model moments from our m
th
simulation.10 Following this, I provide the model with the first period parameters (the ’trial’
parameters), period-by-period shocks, and probabilities on educational level. The result is a file
of simulated data which includes agent and period identifiers, education level, choice histories,
wage outcomes, wealth, and the cumulative years of experience gained in each occupation
choice. Then, the moments of my simulated data are computed and compared to the actual
data.
3.7 Calibration Results
In the following section, I describe the identification of parameters, the fit of the calibrated
model, as well as interpret the calibrated parameters and outline the most important moments.
The following subsection compares the simulated empirical data moments to the observed
empirical data moments.
3.7.1 Identification
Various moments, which are conditional on the individual’s age as well as transition matrices,
are used to identify the calibrated parameters in my life-cycle model. In the modelling of discrete
choice dynamic programming models, all of the elements of the state space are represented in
the alternative-specific value functions. However, wage functions are created by using a subset
of state variables. Skills such as education level and work experience are controlled for in the
10The errors that are drawn for the mth simulations of the model must be drawn only once so that the
minimisation problem does not have the underlying sampling changing for each guess of a value of θ. The
random draws for all simulations must be held constant so that the only changing element in the minimisation
problem is the value of the vector of parameters θ.
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wage functions, since wages are informed by the human capital acquired from schooling and
experience gained from previous employment. I use full-time and part-time work experience,
dummies for education level, as well as age and previous employment states for both “being
your own boss” and wage-employment states. Wages seem to be less influenced by marriage
and the number of children, which is the reason as to why I do not control for these in my wage
functions. Variations in wages explain the productivity shocks.
The CRRA parameter is informed by transitions between occupation states. Choices of oc-
cupation states create shifts in consumption, because it can be optimal to choose different
occupations at different ages to create optimal life-cycle paths from a life-cycle consumption
point of view. The parameters of the functions on asset and business value are identified by
education, work experience, previous asset levels and business values, because they are closely
tied to the data on wages, and the occupation choice distributions.
3.7.2 Model Fit
To evaluate the model and the fit of its calibration results, I use the calibrated parameters to
create a set of 10,000 (5 times 2,000) individual life-cycle paths from age 25 to age 65. Table
27 in Appendix C.1 outlines the percentage of individuals in the sample choosing each occupa-
tional choice, and comparing the simulated data moments to the actual data moments (where
the actual data moments are in parentheses). The model seems to predict these proportions
relatively well, with non-employment being minimally underpredicted and the entrepreneur-
ship states slightly overpredicted. Table 3.7 below lists the one-period transition rates for the
simulated data, and the actual data in parentheses. Row totals sum to 1, or alternatively 100
percent. The model does a good job at replicating the transition rates. However, moves from
a non non-employment state into non-employment is higher in the simulated data than in the
actual data. This also holds for other self-employment to other self-employment and full-time
wage-employment to both entrepreneurship alternatives. The five transition rates of staying
the same mode are reasonably reflected in the simulated transition rate moments.
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Table 3.6: Occupation choice transition rates - Simulated data
State t+1
State t FT PT SE BO NE Total
FT 0.792 0.048 0.022 0.034 0.103 1.00
(0.815) (0.069) (0.013) (0.029) (0.074) (1.00)
PT 0.380 0.264 0.052 0.061 0.241 1.00
(0.430) (0.298) (0.031) (0.032) (0.209) (1.00)
SE 0.152 0.084 0.501 0.209 0.052 1.00
(0.138) (0.104) (0.454) (0.258) (0.046) (1.00)
BO 0.120 0.043 0.019 0.716 0.100 1.00
(0.114) (0.028) (0.077) (0.750) (0.031) (1.00)
NE 0.185 0.101 0.018 0.021 0.675 1.00
(0.141) (0.138) (0.013) (0.019) (0.689) (1.00)
Note: Actual data in parentheses.
3.7.3 Calibrated parameters
Table 3.7 provides calibrated values of the model parameters. Individuals discount expected
utility by 97.51 percent a year ahead. Looking at the CRRA coefficient, it is just below the
calibrated values in studies by Keane and Wolpin (2001), Keane and Imai (2004) and Sauer
(2015), where it ranges between 0.5 and 2. The lower value calibrated for the risk aversion
parameter in this chapter (implying that individuals are less risky) will impact the likelihood of
becoming an entrepreneur, since the variance from income yt from ‘own boss’ income is greatly
higher than the variance from wage-employment income.
There is a positive improvement stemming from continuing entrepreneurship, at 0.0801 the
calibrated value is close to a third of returns from being more than high school educated
(0.2873). However, the utility gained from ‘being your own boss’ is two thirds the size of the
utility gained form wage-employment. It is also interesting to point out that in Appendix C.3,
the earnings potential of those in business ownership becomes larger faster than those in full-
time wage-employment and particularly in other self-employment. Calibrated values on the
return from high school education suggest that high school education is not as important for
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‘own boss’ income compared to wage-employment income, and that a qualification beyond high
school has a positive impact on the entrepreneur’s returns. The opposite holds for full-time
work experience, which has twice as large an estimate on the wage-employment wage than the
wage for entrepreneurs.
Table 3.7: Model parameters
Function Parameter Variable (Returns to) Calibrated Value
ut β Time discount factor 0.9751
λ CRRA constant 0.4627
Φwet Utility from being wage-employed 310.1635
Φobt Utility form being your own boss 250.2311
ut Non-employment preference shock 136.7126
wwet β0we Constant 8.7283
β1we Indicator - High school educated 0.2274
β2we Indicator - More than high school educated 0.6116
β3we Age 0.0459
β4we Age squared -0.0002
β5we Full-time work experience 0.0094
β6we Full-time work experience squared -0.0003
β7we Part-time work experience -0.0366
β8we Part-time work experience squared 0.0013
β9we Indicator - Full-time wage-employed in t− 1 0.0052
β10we Indicator - Part-time wage-employed in t− 1 -0.0011
wet Idiosyncratic productivity shock 0.2131
wobt β0ob Constant 6.9653
β1ob Indicator - High school educated -0.7866
β2ob Indicator - More than high school educated 0.2873
β3ob Age 0.1015
β4ob Age squared -0.0009
β5ob Full-time work experience 0.0056
β6ob Full-time work experience squared -0.0001
β7ob Part-time work experience -0.1122
β8ob Part-time work experience squared 0.0036
β9ob Indicator - Own boss in t− 1 0.0801
β10ob Business value 0.0082
obt Idiosyncratic productivity shock 0.6365
at γ0 Constant -9.635
γ1 Indicator - High school educated 0.2740
γ2 Indicator - More than high school educated 0.6312
. . . . . . . . . . . .
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γ3 Age 1.2421
γ4 Age squared -0.021
γ5 Full-time work experience 0.1206
γ6 Full-time work experience squared -0.0022
γ7 Part-time work experience -0.0564
γ8 Part-time work experience squared 0.0091
γ9 Indicator - Own boss in t− 1 0.0002
vt ζ0 Constant 7.4435
ζ1 Indicator - High school educated 0.1065
ζ2 Indicator - More than high school educated 0.4427
ζ3 Age 0.1375
ζ4 Age squared -0.0013
ζ5 Full-time work experience -0.0189
ζ6 Full-time work experience squared 0.008
ζ7 Part-time work experience -0.1466
ζ8 Part-time work experience squared 0.0037
ζ9 Indicator - Own boss in t− 1 0.0352
vt Idiosyncratic business value shock 0.5891
cmin Consumption floor 129.3629
For the lower bound of net wealth, age plays a significant positive factor, as well as education and
full-time work experience. More part-time work experience results in lower returns to the lower
bound net wealth value. These results further differ for the business value function. Where
the returns from education and age are positive, the returns from full-time work experience
and the returns from part-time work experience are negative, suggesting that business value
does not benefit from an individual’s work experience. However, having had entrepreneurship
experience in the previous period impacts the business’s value positively.
3.8 Counterfactual Analysis
Having calibrated a dynamic structural model provides the opportunity to conduct counterfac-
tual evaluations on changes in exogenous variables. It is a great tool in empirical research, and
I use it to predict the effects of three different ex ante counterfactual policies. Using my cali-
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brated model, I simulate agents’ decisions according to each counterfactual, and then contrast
those to the baseline agent decisions.
Table 3.9 uses the key measurement of population percentages in each occupational category,
and compares the baseline to the three policies used for counterfactual evaluations. Policy I
relaxes the borrowing constraint by making the net wealth floor negatively larger and setting
at = −20, 000 Euros for any state and all individuals.11 Policy II focuses on providing busi-
ness owners with business capital in form of a subsidy. Therefore, business value vt will be
adjusted by including a subsidy, such that vt + subsidy where subsidy = 20, 000 Euros. The
last counterfactual evaluation, Policy III, is providing indirect incentives by educating the
labour force through the supply of training to increase entrepreneurial human capital. I do
this by increasing β0ob, by raising it to the value of the constant in the wage-employment wage
function, β0we. Table 3.9 outlines how the counterfactual policies compared to the baseline
population percentages in each occupation state.
Table 3.8: Counterfactual outcomes on occupation state rates
Variable Baseline Policy I Policy II Policy III
Full-Time Employed 59.32 60.31 59.30 58.91
Part-Time Employed 10.58 9.56 9.15 9.48
Business Owner 13.71 11.22 16.38 15.41
Other Self-Employed 5.69 5.13 4.98 6.27
Non-Employed 10.67 13.75 10.19 9.93
Policy I significantly reduces the percentage of individuals in business ownership from 13.71
percent to 11.22 percent, and only slightly affects the percentage of individuals in other self-
employment. At the same time, the percentage of individuals in non-employment has climbed
by 3.08 percentage points. Policy III and in particular Policy II move in the opposite direction,
where the percentage of the population in business ownership increased. Policy III also leads
to an increase in other self-employed individuals, and seems to be reducing the percentage of
non-employed individuals.
11Compared to the calibrated lower bound in the range of -1,800 Euros to -11,250 Euros.
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Table 3.9 highlights changes in one-period transition rates that are key to this study. Policy I
causes an increase in the number of individuals that stay in business ownership, whereas Policy
II and III lead to a decline in the persistence of individuals within business ownership. Policy
III further increases the transitioning from full-time wage-employment to business ownership,
as well as full-time wage-employment to other self-employment. Lastly, under Policy I there
exists an increase in the number of business owners and other self-employed moving into non-
employment.
Table 3.9: Key changes in transition rates
Variable Baseline Policy I Policy II Policy III
FT to BO 0.029 0.025 0.029 0.031
BO to BO 0.750 0.796 0.746 0.730
BO to NE 0.031 0.033 0.027 0.030
FT to SE 0.013 0.013 0.011 0.021
SE to SE 0.454 0.452 0.456 0.501
SE to NE 0.013 0.015 0.012 0.009
To summarise, it depends on what the aim is of a policy to tackle entrepreneurship. If the
goal is to increase the number of entrepreneurs within an economy, then policy II and III are
most effective. This means that the number of entrepreneurs rises when business subsidies are
provided at the point of becoming an entrepreneur (policy II). The number of entrepreneurs
also increases when individuals are better educated on entrepreneurship (policy III).
However, if the aim is not to increase the number of entrepreneurs, but to increase the duration
of entrepreneurship after individuals entered entrepreneurship, policy I is the better choice.
Under policy I, the borrowing constraint is relaxed. Every individual has access to a bank
loan of up 20,000 Euros, which makes it easier for already existing entrepreneurs to stay in
entrepreneurship for longer.
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3.9 Conclusion
In this chapter, I calibrated a discrete choice dynamic programming model of entrepreneurship
with data from the German Socio-Economic Panel. The life-cycle model captures the impact
of borrowing constraints, business capital, and entrepreneurial human capital. I evaluated the
effect of improving each of these factors separately in three counterfactual evaluations, while
also including two types of entrepreneurs in the set of occupational choices for the individual’s
occupation decision.
My results outline how each counterfactual evaluation affects two key measurements, which
are (a) the percentage of individuals in each occupation state, and (b) the transition rates in
entrepreneurship. I show that the relaxation of borrowing constraints can enhance the longevity
of entrepreneurship, and in particular the total lifetime of a registered business. Providing
entrepreneurship-specific training or a subsidy towards the business does not have the same
impact on the persistence of individuals in business ownership. However, these latter two
counterfactual evaluations have a larger impact on individuals entering into entrepreneurship,
particularly for those entering into business ownership.
This portrays how differing types of support for entrepreneurs have varying impacts on the two
key measurements used in this study. Depending on whether an increase in the duration of
the entrepreneur’s endeavor or an increase in the overall number of entrepreneurs is desired,
policies will have to be implemented accordingly. If aiming for longer lasting businesses and
self-employment, then policies should aim at relaxing borrowing constraints. If an increase in
the number of individuals entering into entrepreneurship is the target, then policies should be
focusing on providing entrepreneurship-specific training or providing an injection of business
capital.
The findings hold for Germany, and are dependent on that. They will likely vary for different
countries and different model frameworks and setups, such as including both genders and/or
other ethnicities. This might be of particular interest, since programs are being created that
are aiming at underrepresented groups within entrepreneurship or providing an alternative to
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unemployment. Additionally, it would be interesting for future research to extend the study to
include not only a single agent’s wealth and occupation choices, but also the choices of other
household members, the cost of children in the household, and risk preferences.
Appendices
A Further Regressions
Table 10: First Stage Regressions - Female Sample
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Log Net Wealth Log Net Wealth Log Net Wealth Log Net Wealth
Receipt of Gift 0.6624∗∗∗ 0.6258∗∗∗
(0.10748) (0.10454)
Receipt of Lottery Winning 0.6049∗∗ 0.8209∗∗∗
(0.30147) (0.25654)
Age 0.1132∗∗∗ 0.1170∗∗∗ 0.1169∗∗∗ 0.1207∗∗∗
(0.01942) (0.01926) (0.01950) (0.01933)
Age2 -0.0005∗∗ -0.0006∗∗∗ -0.0006∗∗∗ -0.0006∗∗∗
(0.00021) (0.00021) (0.00021) (0.00021)
Years of Education 0.0355∗∗∗ 0.0338∗∗∗ 0.0366∗∗∗ 0.0345∗∗∗
(0.00803) (0.00789) (0.00804) (0.00789)
Work Experience FT -0.0074 -0.0051 -0.0089 -0.0064
(0.00784) (0.00777) (0.00786) (0.00779)
Work Experience FT2 -0.0001 -0.0002 -0.0001 -0.0001
(0.00018) (0.00018) (0.00018) (0.00018)
Work Experience PT 0.0056 0.0048 0.0066 0.0056
(0.00839) (0.00828) (0.00841) (0.00830)
Work Experience PT2 0.0005∗ 0.0005 0.0004 0.0004
(0.00028) (0.00028) (0.00028) (0.00028)
Working Partner 0.3879∗∗∗ 0.3987∗∗∗ 0.3813∗∗∗ 0.3919∗∗∗
(0.04149) (0.04076) (0.04161) (0.04084)
Number of Children 0.2891∗∗∗ 0.2992∗∗∗ 0.2873∗∗∗ 0.2960∗∗∗
(0.02497) (0.02438) (0.02496) (0.02436)
Gave birth t-1 0.2277∗ 0.2985∗∗ 0.2945∗∗ 0.3671∗∗∗
(0.13066) (0.12739) (0.13329) (0.13056)
Gave birth t-5 -0.2044 -0.2028 -0.1750 -0.1782
(0.12836) (0.12424) (0.13006) (0.12566)
Log of Income 0.2384∗∗∗ 0.2283∗∗∗ 0.2375∗∗∗ 0.2275∗∗∗
(0.02080) (0.02027) (0.02079) (0.02027)
Manufacturing Sector 0.2608∗∗∗ 0.2386∗∗∗ 0.2833∗∗∗ 0.2594∗∗∗
(0.07396) (0.07312) (0.07471) (0.07383)
Service Sector -0.0377 -0.0287 -0.0283 -0.0198
(0.04450) (0.04405) (0.04456) (0.04409)
Constant 3.2925∗∗∗ 3.2640∗∗∗ 3.2357∗∗∗ 3.2095∗∗∗
(0.43427) (0.42947) (0.43576) (0.43074)
Observations 6957 7263 6957 7263
R2 0.0551 0.0225 0.0303 0.0347
F 38.03 35.94 16.38 10.33
Robust standard errors in parentheses.∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 11: IV Regressions - Female Sample
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Self-Employed Business Owner Self-Employed Business Owner
Gift Gift Lottery Winning Lottery Winning
Log of Net Wealth 0.0604∗∗∗ 0.0728∗∗ 0.0618∗ 0.0850∗∗
(0.03316) (0.03076) (0.03330) (0.08202)
Age 0.0053 0.0040 0.0125∗∗∗ -0.0175
(0.00461) (0.00425) (0.00459) (0.01067)
Age2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0001∗∗ 0.0001
(0.00003) (0.00003) (0.00003) (0.00006)
Years of Education 0.0002 0.0017 0.0058∗∗∗ 0.0023
(0.00174) (0.00152) (0.00177) (0.00333)
Work Experience FT 0.0018 0.0023∗∗ 0.0005 0.0030∗
(0.00114) (0.00106) (0.00106) (0.00169)
Work Experience FT2 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000∗∗ -0.0000
(0.00002) (0.00002) (0.00002) (0.00004)
Work Experience PT -0.0014 0.0015 -0.0005 0.0009
(0.00120) (0.00113) (0.00111) (0.00184)
Work Experience PT2 -0.0000 -0.0001∗∗∗ 0.0001 -0.0001∗∗
(0.00004) (0.00004) (0.00004) (0.00007)
Working Partner 0.0325∗∗ -0.0228∗ 0.0254∗ -0.0667∗∗
(0.01398) (0.01325) (0.01365) (0.03303)
Number of Children -0.0106 -0.0130 0.0330∗∗∗ -0.0461∗
(0.01013) (0.01006) (0.01045) (0.02482)
Gave birth t-1 -0.0295 -0.0106 0.0147 -0.0511
(0.01977) (0.02045) (0.01514) (0.03979)
Gave birth t-5 0.0415∗ 0.0374∗ 0.0142 0.0580∗
(0.02183) (0.02237) (0.02145) (0.03400)
Log of Income -0.0300∗∗∗ -0.0204∗∗∗ 0.0061 -0.0457∗∗
(0.00902) (0.00761) (0.00837) (0.01918)
Manufacturing Sector -0.0258∗ -0.0419∗∗∗ -0.0170 -0.0704∗∗∗
(0.01350) (0.01196) (0.01206) (0.02564)
Service Sector 0.0293∗∗∗ 0.0073 0.0249∗∗∗ 0.0098
(0.00661) (0.00588) (0.00619) (0.00934)
Constant -0.4079∗∗∗ -0.3435∗∗∗ -0.0857 -0.7039∗∗
(0.12090) (0.11267) (0.12029) (0.27761)
Observations 6957 7263 6957 7263
R2 0.1780 0.1790 0.1740 0.1759
Chi2 82.1519 77.3549 93.4804 33.0016
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 12: First Stage Regressions - Female Sample
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Log Net Wealth Log Net Wealth Log Net Wealth Log Net Wealth
Windfall Income in 1,000s 0.0088∗∗∗ 0.0090∗∗∗
(0.00065) (0.00066)
Inheritance in 1,000s 0.0057∗∗ 0.0054∗∗
(0.00241) (0.00250)
Age 0.1208∗∗∗ 0.1258∗∗∗ 0.1053 0.0896
(0.01940) (0.01922) (0.14178) (0.14069)
Age2 -0.0006∗∗∗ -0.0007∗∗∗ -0.0006 -0.0004
(0.00021) (0.00021) (0.00153) (0.00152)
Years of Education 0.0365∗∗∗ 0.0346∗∗∗ 0.1456∗∗∗ 0.1479∗∗∗
(0.00798) (0.00783) (0.05313) (0.05372)
Work Experience Full-Time -0.0101 -0.0074 -0.0862∗∗ -0.0588
(0.00782) (0.00772) (0.04298) (0.04135)
Work Experience FT2 -0.0000 -0.0001 0.0025∗∗∗ 0.0016∗∗
(0.00018) (0.00017) (0.00084) (0.00078)
Work Experience Part-Time 0.0047 0.0041 -0.0433 -0.0469
(0.00834) (0.00823) (0.04657) (0.04731)
Work Experience PT2 0.0005∗ 0.0005∗ 0.0011 0.0012
(0.00028) (0.00028) (0.00146) (0.00148)
Working Partner 0.3823∗∗∗ 0.3940∗∗∗ 0.7231∗∗ 0.6454∗∗
(0.04124) (0.04051) (0.29014) (0.27851)
Number of Children 0.2903∗∗∗ 0.3006∗∗∗ -0.0473 -0.0407
(0.02485) (0.02425) (0.14893) (0.14980)
Gave birth t-1 0.2712∗∗ 0.3255∗∗ 0.2507∗ 0.2121∗
(0.13117) (0.12698) (0.71163) (0.69166)
Gave birth t-5 -0.1604 -0.1614 -0.8366∗∗ -0.8840∗∗
(0.12958) (0.12519) (0.39953) (0.40006)
Log of Income 0.2332∗∗∗ 0.2215∗∗∗ 0.0011 0.0252
(0.02069) (0.02017) (0.17154) (0.17011)
Manufacturing Sector 0.2818∗∗∗ 0.2545∗∗∗ 0.3991 0.5524
(0.07433) (0.07343) (0.34678) (0.33504)
Service Sector -0.0440 -0.0420 -0.4163 -0.3729
(0.04431) (0.04378) (0.31125) (0.31040)
Constant 3.1425∗∗∗ 3.1102∗∗∗ 3.8099 3.8186
(0.43359) (0.42872) (3.74039) (3.75192)
Observations 6957 7263 140 143
R2 0.0592 0.0323 0.0484 0.0483
F 174.36 175.67 10.02 11.05
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 13: IV Regressions - Female Sample
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Self-Employed Business Owner Self-Employed Business Owner
Windfall Income Windfall Income Inheritance Inheritance
Log of Net Wealth 0.0030 0.0504∗∗∗ 0.0233 0.0351
(0.00844) (0.01712) (0.14074) (0.03833)
Age 0.0049∗∗ 0.0012 0.0097 0.0070
(0.00228) (0.00299) (0.04673) (0.00807)
Age2 -0.0000∗ -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0001
(0.00002) (0.00002) (0.00050) (0.00009)
Years of Education 0.0034∗∗∗ 0.0025∗∗ 0.0540∗∗ 0.0068
(0.00108) (0.00119) (0.02673) (0.00693)
Work Experience Full-Time 0.0011 0.0022∗∗ -0.0277 -0.0142∗∗
(0.00087) (0.00098) (0.02086) (0.00579)
Work Experience FT2 -0.0000∗∗ -0.0000 0.0007 0.0005∗∗∗
(0.00002) (0.00002) (0.00043) (0.00018)
Work Experience Part-Time -0.0009 0.0017 -0.0070 0.0039
(0.00092) (0.00105) (0.01681) (0.00334)
Work Experience PT2 0.0000 -0.0001∗∗∗ 0.0001 -0.0001
(0.00003) (0.00003) (0.00043) (0.00010)
Working Partner 0.0007 0.0140 0.2169 0.0122
(0.00581) (0.00851) (0.13503) (0.03440)
Number of Children 0.0144∗∗∗ -0.0063 0.0670 -0.0024
(0.00472) (0.00626) (0.05196) (0.00843)
Gave birth t-1 -0.0041 -0.0025 0.1685 -0.0185
(0.01060) (0.01685) (0.22970) (0.05126)
Gave birth t-5 0.0259 0.0332 -0.1334 0.0553
(0.01839) (0.02113) (0.19340) (0.04744)
Log of Income -0.0093∗∗ -0.0153∗∗∗ -0.0327 -0.0143
(0.00361) (0.00463) (0.05536) (0.00977)
Manufacturing Sector -0.0012 -0.0361∗∗∗ -0.0909 -0.1077∗
(0.00685) (0.00856) (0.13862) (0.05663)
Service Sector 0.0268∗∗∗ 0.0068 -0.0533 -0.0095
(0.00534) (0.00564) (0.11614) (0.02022)
Constant -0.1245∗∗ -0.2713∗∗∗ -0.0145 -0.1586
(0.05072) (0.07163) (1.36981) (0.23412)
Observations 6957 7263 140 143
R2 0.0231 0.1873 0.2529 0.2941
Chi2 120.8603 95.0091 20.2591 8.6768
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 14: First Stage Regressions - Female Sample
(1) (2)
Log of Net Wealth Log of Net Wealth
Gift in 1,000s 0.0040∗∗ 0.0047∗∗
(0.00201) (0.00195)
Age 0.1282 0.1285
(0.15999) (0.15174)
Age2 -0.0018 -0.0018
(0.00198) (0.00188)
Years of Education 0.0520 0.0255
(0.05028) (0.05021)
Work Experience Full-Time -0.0085 0.0066
(0.08296) (0.07557)
Work Experience FT2 0.0019 0.0018
(0.00230) (0.00215)
Work Experience Part-Time 0.0433 0.0578
(0.05604) (0.05362)
Work Experience PT2 0.0046 0.0038
(0.00347) (0.00306)
Working Partner 0.3820 0.2922
(0.26780) (0.26165)
Number of Children 0.0994 0.1130
(0.20825) (0.17892)
Gave birth t-1 -0.7261 -0.0879
(0.61492) (0.55527)
Gave birth t-5 0.7200 0.4456
(0.55082) (0.61769)
Log of Income 0.6551∗∗∗ 0.4821∗∗∗
(0.14509) (0.13285)
Manufacturing Sector -0.6884 -0.6900
(0.51256) (0.51729)
Service Sector 0.6547∗∗ 0.6708∗∗
(0.28803) (0.27719)
Constant 3.2368 4.1384
(3.24954) (3.04123)
Observations 146 161
R2 0.3286 0.4357
F 10.58 13.72
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 15: IV Regressions - Female Sample
(1) (2)
Self-Employed Business Owner
Gift Gift
Log of Net Wealth 0.0275 0.0433∗
(0.07306) (0.02175)
Age 0.0360 0.0646∗∗
(0.02636) (0.03288)
Age2 -0.0005 -0.0007∗
(0.00030) (0.00039)
Years of Education 0.0002 0.0008
(0.00978) (0.01268)
Work Experience Full-Time 0.0000 0.0163
(0.00815) (0.01396)
Work Experience FT2 0.0003 0.0001
(0.00024) (0.00040)
Work Experience Part-Time 0.0063 -0.0175
(0.00955) (0.01558)
Work Experience PT2 -0.0002 -0.0001
(0.00060) (0.00071)
Working Partner 0.0529 0.0150
(0.04538) (0.05663)
Number of Children 0.0454 -0.0788∗
(0.02829) (0.04683)
Gave birth t-1 -0.0610 0.1260
(0.08485) (0.10144)
Gave birth t-5 -0.2354∗∗ -0.2132∗∗
(0.10945) (0.10676)
Log of Income -0.1440∗∗ -0.1231∗∗
(0.06266) (0.05844)
Manufacturing Sector 0.0030 0.0639
(0.06217) (0.07951)
Service Sector 0.1548∗ -0.1145
(0.08196) (0.10577)
Constant 0.4246 0.6290∗∗
(0.52535) (0.80554)
Observations 146 161
R2 0.3775 0. 3312
Chi2 46.8473 17.3321
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 16: First Stage Regressions - Net Wealth
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Log Net Wealth Log Net Wealth Log Net Wealth Log Net Wealth
Receipt of Windfall Income 0.7698∗∗∗
(0.07734)
Receipt of Inheritance 0.9973∗∗∗
(0.12048)
Receipt of Gift 0.6258∗∗∗
(0.10454)
Receipt of Lottery Winning 0.8209∗∗∗
(0.25654)
Constant 3.2968∗∗∗ 3.2409∗∗∗ 3.2640∗∗∗ 3.2095∗∗∗
(0.42822) (0.42846) (0.42947) (0.43074)
Observations 7242 7263 7263 7263
R2 0.185 0.182 0.179 0.176
F 104.3256 103.1583 100.7793 99.1815
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 17: First Stage Regressions - Home Value
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Log Home Value Log Home Value Log Home Value Log Home Value
Receipt of Windfall Income 0.2184∗∗∗
(0.04037)
Receipt of Inheritance 0.2469∗∗∗
(0.05105)
Receipt of Gift 0.2188∗∗∗
(0.05814)
Receipt of Lottery Winning 0.1176∗∗
(0.06349)
Constant 10.6339∗∗∗ 10.6221∗∗∗ 10.6534∗∗∗ 10.6354∗∗∗
(0.28301) (0.28242) (0.28339) (0.28308)
Observations 3632 3646 3646 3646
R2 0.064 0.061 0.062 0.058
F 14.7376 14.2910 13.5865 13.3313
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 18: First Stage Regressions - Years of Education
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Years of Educa Years of Educa Years of Educa Years of Educa
Receipt of Windfall Income 0.6298∗∗∗
(0.05612)
Receipt of Inheritance 0.4313∗∗∗
(0.08312)
Receipt of Gift 0.7969∗∗∗
(0.07734)
Receipt of Lottery Winning 0.4063
(0.24752)
Constant 8.7987∗∗∗ 8.8012∗∗∗ 8.7993∗∗∗ 8.8099∗∗∗
(0.23529) (0.23509) (0.23484) (0.23515)
Observations 47020 47150 47150 47150
R2 0.144 0.142 0.144 0.142
F 573.2823 567.0130 575.2477 564.7040
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 19: First Stage Regressions - Financial Assets
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Log Fin. Assets Log Fin. Assets Log Fin. Assets Log Fin. Assets
Receipt of Windfall Income 0.4975∗∗∗
(0.06800)
Receipt of Inheritance 0.5769∗∗∗
(0.12015)
Receipt of Gift 0.4869∗∗∗
(0.08211)
Receipt of Lottery Winning 0.1666
(0.22660)
Constant 5.4220∗∗∗ 5.4235∗∗∗ 5.3892∗∗∗ 5.3752∗∗∗
(0.40951) (0.40947) (0.40911) (0.41068)
Observations 4660 4667 4667 4667
R2 0.133 0.129 0.130 0.125
F 43.9490 42.7840 43.0761 41.2427
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 20: First Stage Regressions - Tangible Assets
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Log Tan. Assets Log Tan. Assets lLog Tan. Assets Log Tan. Assets
Receipt of Windfall Income 0.2017
(0.22752)
Receipt of Inheritance 0.5129∗∗
(0.25992)
Receipt of Gift 0.4129
(0.44739)
Receipt of Lottery Winning 0.5559∗∗
(0.21632)
Constant 6.7169∗∗∗ 6.7491∗∗∗ 6.8175∗∗∗ 6.7752∗∗∗
(1.41827) (1.42094) (1.41741) (1.42154)
Observations 519 519 519 519
R2 0.183 0.188 0.183 0.182
F 7.5382 7.7672 7.7806 9.5577
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 22: Business Owners with more than one period of Business Ownership
(1) (2)
Business Owner ≥ two periods Business Owner ≥ two periods
Windfall Income Inheritance
Log of Net Wealth 0.0120 0.5261
(0.42857) (1.45203)
Age 0.0837∗∗ 0.0620
(0.03362) (0.08791)
Age2 -0.0009∗ -0.0015
(0.00054) (0.00169)
Years of Education -0.0047 0.0243
(0.02509) (0.08381)
Work Experience Full-Time -0.0079 -0.0194
(0.01194) (0.03917)
Work Experience FT2 0.0002 0.0011
(0.00081) (0.00282)
Work Experience Part-Time -0.0237 0.0260
(0.04493) (0.14271)
Work Experience PT2 0.0008 -0.0011
(0.00181) (0.00578)
Working Partner -0.0661 -0.2568
(0.16810) (0.55124)
Number of Children 0.0360 -0.1315
(0.14472) (0.47623)
Gave birth t-1 0.0199 -0.6410
(0.55990) (1.88588)
Gave birth t-5 -0.1647 0.5792
(0.62490) (2.11241)
Log of Income 0.0226 -0.0191
(0.04103) (0.12583)
Manufacturing Sector 0.1573 0.5808
(0.37290) (1.28359)
Service Sector 0.0019 0.0605
(0.07364) (0.20656)
Constant -1.7089 -5.5491
(3.26064) (11.00754)
Observations 306 306
R2 0.106 0.093
chi2 50.0362 10.6790
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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B Constructing the Data
The sample X selected from the SOEP data and used for calibration is constructed by the
following criteria:
1. The first exclusion restriction is on gender. Since this paper is interested in providing a
model on male entrepreneurship, females are removed from the sample.
2. After observing that there is no significant amount of business ownership before the age
of 25 years, I keep observations of individuals from age 25 to 65 only.
3. Widowed individuals are excluded, since the death of a partner can provide financial
means that are not identified by the data.
4. To reduce heterogeneity within the sample, I exclude ethnic minorities.
The rest of Appendix B lists the tables concerning section 3.3 in Chapter 3, and provides
detailed age profiles of labour supply states, individual income and net wealth.
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Table 23: Occupation States (% )
Age FT PT BO SE NE Total
20 3.29 22.30 0.23 0.47 73.71 100.00
21 9.95 31.84 0.75 0.75 56.72 100.00
22 17.12 34.25 1.14 0.68 46.80 100.00
23 28.09 29.38 1.55 1.29 39.69 100.00
24 34.16 33.17 0.75 1.25 30.67 100.00
25 38.50 30.19 1.66 3.60 26.04 100.00
26 47.83 24.93 2.61 2.03 22.61 100.00
27 53.06 27.11 1.75 2.33 15.74 100.00
28 57.96 24.02 2.70 3.30 12.01 100.00
29 65.96 15.96 2.39 5.05 10.64 100.00
30 69.29 14.44 2.89 6.04 7.35 100.00
31 69.23 15.65 1.86 6.63 6.63 100.00
32 70.54 13.70 3.36 7.49 4.91 100.00
33 75.00 11.32 3.54 6.60 3.54 100.00
34 74.12 7.68 1.75 10.09 6.36 100.00
35 69.96 11.66 3.36 9.19 5.83 100.00
36 72.93 8.89 2.02 11.11 5.05 100.00
37 72.02 9.05 4.12 10.70 4.12 100.00
38 73.88 7.46 2.80 10.26 5.60 100.00
39 73.77 8.80 2.11 9.68 5.63 100.00
40 69.78 9.53 3.78 12.77 4.14 100.00
41 73.19 6.75 4.89 10.79 4.38 100.00
42 70.09 7.01 3.59 14.19 5.13 100.00
43 69.62 7.68 2.84 13.69 6.18 100.00
44 70.15 8.23 2.57 12.52 6.52 100.00
45 69.91 9.06 3.08 13.16 4.79 100.00
46 70.94 8.54 3.78 9.85 6.90 100.00
47 68.39 9.03 2.68 13.55 6.35 100.00
48 69.19 7.75 2.75 12.91 7.40 100.00
49 68.93 8.10 3.58 12.43 6.97 100.00
50 65.58 11.47 2.87 12.81 7.27 100.00
51 69.60 7.91 4.50 9.53 8.45 100.00
52 68.88 7.82 3.06 10.88 9.35 100.00
53 64.62 8.38 2.79 11.17 13.04 100.00
54 67.37 7.53 3.47 10.81 10.81 100.00
55 62.14 10.70 2.88 11.11 13.17 100.00
56 61.71 10.18 3.87 10.39 13.85 100.00
57 57.77 9.02 2.88 12.09 18.23 100.00
58 57.09 12.77 2.99 8.58 18.56 100.00
59 53.91 13.37 3.09 10.91 18.72 100.00
60 47.57 13.11 4.65 7.82 26.85 100.00
61 41.12 16.32 3.31 8.47 30.79 100.00
62 32.25 12.02 2.86 7.06 45.80 100.00
63 30.99 10.84 1.90 6.84 49.43 100.00
64 19.31 14.53 2.87 7.07 56.21 100.00
65 12.16 11.32 2.31 5.87 68.34 100.00
Total 43.99 11.50 2.50 7.44 34.57 100.00
Note 1: FT = full-time wage-employed, PT = part-time wage-employed, BO = business owner, SE = other self-
employed and NE = non-employed. Note 2: The total percentages differ to Table 3.3, since I include individuals
aged 17 to 65 in the above table to motivate the initial age at which an individual enters the model. There is
no significant amount of male business ownership before the age of 25. Thus, the sequential decision-making of
the agent starts at age a = 25. I exclude the option of being wage-employed and self-employed, since I show in
Table 3.3 that this percentage is below 1 percent overall.
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Table 24: Average Individual Income by Age and State
State
Age FT PT SE BO NE
20 13725.08 5010.864 2995.572 2750.00 3057.98700
21 17093.48 7381.696 29886.400 18987.67 3354.59900
22 19297.72 7913.580 4702.500 14274.40 3346.49800
23 20514.52 7402.801 6537.273 35084.00 3127.52400
24 21888.15 8182.589 3234.750 13276.86 2635.55200
25 22909.80 7392.375 9133.167 15759.36 2088.61400
26 23623.85 7163.162 12872.830 20243.45 1447.14300
27 25823.80 9589.394 21789.230 20922.91 642.91610
28 26308.35 9543.079 15529.680 32553.45 439.32370
29 28265.81 10695.720 14853.600 26191.88 451.88810
30 30852.19 10480.160 17367.840 34536.87 725.57380
31 31579.60 12034.730 17977.230 43930.43 195.31750
32 32806.16 11301.010 21670.570 38396.83 201.97540
33 32191.95 12909.760 28415.000 34532.86 84.47482
34 34889.91 12501.650 18330.350 38604.20 590.65560
35 36169.14 12248.790 25349.320 43156.39 134.80790
36 37218.34 13554.510 24775.190 40756.38 299.44850
37 37352.27 13092.810 39548.630 41484.73 165.93710
38 38149.62 13153.120 19279.150 53752.34 212.16670
39 38022.31 14537.330 32411.530 53222.46 223.50340
40 40057.48 14375.980 29897.000 49438.57 439.06920
41 40535.06 14685.090 35015.760 43944.52 236.97940
42 39470.61 15359.940 25744.330 51365.79 378.80880
43 40776.29 14867.140 34677.790 49374.64 143.43540
44 39903.21 15137.460 30077.230 56762.26 218.68670
45 41287.59 15882.530 39547.180 56153.08 228.32650
46 43319.65 17017.710 45040.890 54256.46 153.61840
47 41942.02 16018.790 39477.270 60968.27 79.03226
48 42077.56 14679.540 48531.410 60225.11 247.19600
49 41280.84 15818.220 30829.590 57109.89 192.03030
50 42917.66 17600.590 32044.720 63472.56 136.18250
51 44177.91 15094.740 49747.090 50763.57 300.52470
52 41598.10 16678.670 34381.150 76089.41 589.18650
53 44157.58 17370.690 37608.450 59975.16 154.84920
54 44007.13 16764.220 29941.900 74858.98 295.51350
55 42315.74 17203.180 33297.870 58173.60 1070.10900
56 45251.18 17499.170 47527.050 48576.58 368.96190
57 51712.75 17332.890 30824.450 64961.01 890.88360
58 45691.90 16479.570 29184.810 68558.77 855.58940
59 42483.70 15817.330 48890.310 89815.96 2141.71100
60 44415.85 17227.940 28055.120 62350.47 2848.66300
61 43256.08 14710.090 41360.760 58070.58 1939.55000
62 52579.36 16242.900 25924.040 50856.85 1277.08300
63 50632.89 12502.480 17592.130 78960.11 2580.54400
64 47828.27 13416.730 34305.000 69797.35 1189.63300
65 51385.93 10994.380 25862.320 45004.97 968.74010
Note 1: FT = full-time wage-employed, PT = part-time wage-employed, BO = business owner, SE = other
self-employed and NE = non-employed.
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Table 25: Average Individual Net Wealth by Age
Age Mean Median
25 6123.84 1000
26 10145.83 1000
27 12791.66 2500
28 21515.83 2260
29 15961.98 2800
30 21021.50 5000
31 30105.94 5000
32 44328.29 7000
33 42848.50 9500
34 57569.90 11900
35 48218.73 13000
36 59297.77 16200
37 63562.49 17500
38 64424.34 25000
39 76673.95 27234
40 95296.27 34000
41 89955.73 34050
42 94170.88 38250
43 105254.90 40000
44 104482.60 49408
45 129147.00 48500
46 115353.10 50000
47 127071.40 50000
48 117395.90 54000
49 135652.10 60000
50 139875.50 60125
51 142270.50 65500
52 184986.40 60000
53 131428.10 65000
54 154940.00 70500
55 133432.40 80422
56 165547.20 73400
57 198954.70 80000
58 167746.00 85503
59 171830.90 75000
60 169965.80 84750
61 162540.40 75000
62 176093.30 73875
63 180799.90 76250
64 176524.70 76847
65 149030.20 66000
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C Model Fit
C.1 Occupation state percentages - simulated data
Table 26: Labor supply decisions (%)
Variable Labor Supply State
Full-Time Employed 59.33
(61.64)
Part-Time Employed 10.58
(11.14)
Business Owner 13.71
(9.57)
Other Self-Employed 5.69
(3.11)
Non-Employed 10.67
(14.52)
Notes: Actual data in parentheses.
C.2 Occupation levels by age
Figure 6: Full-time wage-employment
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Figure 7: Part-time wage-employment
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Figure 8: Self-employed
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Figure 9: Business owners
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Figure 10: Non-employment
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C.3 Mean income by occupation and by age
Figure 11: Mean income for full-time wage-employment by age
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Figure 12: Mean income for part-time wage-employment by age
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Figure 13: Mean income for self-employment by age
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Figure 14: Mean income for business ownership by age
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C.4 Net wealth levels by age
Figure 15: Mean wealth by age
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Figure 16: Median wealth by age
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